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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article explores a seemingly straightforward question: to what 
extent is a consumer entitled to know how digital products work and the 
likelihood of digital harm? In previous work, I have explored this 
question in the context of contract law and consumer consent.1 This 
Article approaches the question from a different legal context. 
Specifically, this Article considers whether a duty to warn should exist 
in connection with digital products. Even if we assume arguendo that a 
harmed consumer will have difficulty quantifying actual damages, an 
independent duty to warn on the part of the digital product creator or 
operator may still exist. 
Part II, focusing on functionality and information security harms, 
explains the dominant ways that digital products can harm consumers 
through their code and not their content.2 Part III reviews existing 
regulation of digital products. It argues in favor of borrowing the scope 
of the reasonable expectation of safety and duty to warn owed by 
possessors of land to their business visitors upon it. Finally, Part III 
proposes a “reasonable expectation of code safety,” along with a three-
tiered framework inspired by systems theory and the land-based duty to 
warn, protect and repair. Part IV further considers the primary challenge 
against the proposed framework on First Amendment grounds and finds 
it to fully comport with First Amendment protections. Part V concludes. 
II.   HOW DIGITAL PRODUCTS HARM 
Although digital products come in various forms with assorted 
hardware and interfaces, they are all ultimately composed of two 
components: data and code.  
Data is stagnant information. Like a newspaper, data is a non-
interactive image. However, unlike a newspaper, in order to view, open, 
close or otherwise interact with data, assistance is required.3 This 
                                                                                                                     
 1. In previous work I have explored digital consent and generating a reasonableness 
standard for digital contracting, particularly in the context of security-invasive digital rights 
management technology. See, e.g., Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technoconsen(t)sus, 85 WASH. U. 
L.R. 529, 530–33 (2007). 
 2. Code, such as the code in digital rights management software (DRM) or a website, 
frequently knowingly cripples consumers’ existing software and exposes consumers to 
information security risks. DRM software refers to code used to prevent a user from copying or 
otherwise using code in ways not intended by the author. For a discussion of legal implications 
of DRM see, for example, Dan Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights 
Management Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537 (2005).  
 3. For example, a .jpg file is a stagnant image. However, to open a .jpg, code is required. 
It is this code to open .jpg files that has been previously compromised. Se , e.g., Microsoft, 
Security Bulletin MS04-028: Buffer Overrun in JPEG Processing (GDI+) Could Allow Code 
Execution (833987) (Sept. 14, 2004), available at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/ 
2
Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss1/3
2010] HIDDEN ENGINES OF DESTRUCTION 111 
 
assistance comes in the form of code. Code is software that facilitates 
data use. In other words, data is a type of speech—a picture, a 
paragraph of text; code is the method of delivery of the speech—the 
truck with a bullhorn, the pamphleteer on the street corner. The critical 
difference across digital products is simply the number of layers of code 
that interact to generate the user’s emergent experience. 
Although policymakers and scholars frequently consider the impact 
of data content, rarely do they consider the changing impact of the code 
underlying the visible data. Stated succinctly, data involves harms that a 
user can see. For example, through the viewing of a disturbing image, 
data may cause emotional harms to a user; however, these harms are 
nothing new. Although technology may facilitate greater exposure to 
this disturbing content, it is still the individual, under the First 
Amendment, who engages in self-censorship regarding this content. 
Code, on the other hand, involves harms that a user cannot see and 
assess preemptively and therefore, cannot engage in the same self-
censorship. 
A.  Code Harms 
Digital products and communications became a regular fixture in our 
lives in the 1990s.4 At first, code involved relatively transparent harms 
or was substantially harmless by many estimates.5 Apart from a 
relatively brief “cookie scare” in the late 1990s,6 unwanted emails 
garnered attention as the primary policy problem. Ten years later, the 
current code harms to consumers are more serious than a mere 
inconvenience; they increasingly involve consumers’ loss of control and 
use of their own computers and exposure to information security risks.7 
Two categories of digital harm appear to have caused the most 
frustration for consumers: functionality harms and information security 
harms. Functionality harms refer to consumers’ unexpected loss of 
control and use of their own machines. Information security harms refer 
to consumers’ unwitting exposure to information security crime. 
Regarding both these harms, an information imbalance exists in favor of 
                                                                                                                     
bulletin/MS04-028.mspx [hereinafter Microsoft, Security Bulletin]. For example, when 
technologists speak of a “.jpg compromise,” what they really mean is that the code used in 
connection with a .jpg file has been compromised—not the .jpg images themselves. 
 4. See, e.g., Oscar Cisneros, ISPs Say Spam Study Full of Fat, WIRED, June 15, 1999, 
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/1999/06/20234.  
 5. For a discussion of the costs of spam, see, for example, Andrea M. Matwyshyn, 
Penetrating the Zombie Collective: Spam as an International Security Issue, 3 SCRIPTED 370, 
370–71 (2006). 
 6. For a discussion of the cookie scare of the late 1990s, see, for example, STEPHEN 
NORTHCUTT ET AL., INSIDE NETWORK PERIMETER SECURITY 207 (2003).  
 7. Matwyshyn, supra note 5, at 370–71. In the language of economics, these risks are 
properly termed negative externalities.  
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the creators or operators of code. This Article addresses this information 
disparity.8 
1.  Functionality Harms 
Functionality harms occur, for example, when code unexpectedly 
changes settings and preferences,9 cripples other programs on the 
machine,10 and communicates information about the consumer to 
remote third-parties11 without the consumer’s awareness of the 
broadcast information. Although license agreements that accompany 
products sometimes disclose a portion of these activities and risks, the 
disclosure is frequently incomplete and incomprehensible.12 Part of this 
ambiguity may be intentional on the part of the drafters of these 
agreements; some of them may believe that by providing transparency 
to the consumer regarding the code and its function on the consumer’s 
system, the consumer may be provided the knowledge to circumvent the 
code. 
How do these code harms happen in practice? They happen when a 
user interacts with code that has been intentionally degraded, 
improperly written, or compromised. For example, a doctor is preparing 
for surgery and notices that the x-ray images he needs to review appear 
strangely degraded on his computer.13 He is not sure why; he later reads 
                                                                                                                     
 8. It is true that perhaps the larger, more difficult and more sizable component of the 
problems set forth in this Article are the questions concerning the Internet criminality generating 
the risks. However, both parts of the equation need to be addressed—both the underlying 
criminality and the issues involving conduct of legal organizations and individuals that 
exacerbate the risk. This Article starts with the easier of the two. 
 9. For example, code may change registry keys. Glossary, Antispyware Coalition, Oct. 
27, 2005, http://www.antispywarecoalition.org/documents/20051027definitions.pdf. 
 10. See, e.g., Kyle Orland, Vista DRM to Slow Down High-End Graphics?, JOYSTIQ, Dec. 
25, 2006, http://www.joystiq.com/2006/12/25/vista-drm-to-slows-down-high-end-graphics.  
 11. See, e.g., Eric Bangeman, Microsoft Admits Windows Genuine Advantage Phones 
Home, ARS TECHNICA, June 8, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2006/06/7017.ars.  
 12. For example, Sony described its DRM which contained a rootkit to contain “a small 
proprietary software program” in its end user license agreement. Ed Felton, SonyBMG and 
First4Internet Release Mysterious Software Update, FREEDOM TO TINKER, Nov. 3, 2005, 
http://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/sonybmg-and-first4internet-release-mysterious-softwa 
re-update. Sony did not explain any of the numerous information security risks that 
accompanied it. See, e.g., Hiawatha Bray, Security Firm: Sony CDs Secretly Install Spyware, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 8, 2005, at D1, available at http://www.boston.com/business/technology/ 
articles/2005/11/08/security_firm_sony_cds_secretly_install_spyware/. “‘Most people, I think, 
don’t even know what a rootkit is, so why should they care about it?’ the head of Sony BMG’s 
global digital business, Thomas Hesse, told National Public Radio.” Brian Bergstein, Copy 
Protection Still a Work in Progress, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 18, 2005, 
http://msl1.mit.edu/furdlog/docs/2005-11-18_apwire_pulling_a_sony.pdf. 
 13. This example is based on a Windows Vista content protection specification. Andrew 
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online that, in order to make it harder to copy movies, his operating 
system intentionally “downgrades” the quality of all video and audio 
using code (DRM) if they were not output through certain approved 
connections.14 Or perhaps a consumer plays a new CD in her work 
computer. The consumer does not realize that code (DRM) 
accompanied the digital music files. In a preemptive step to prevent the 
consumer from being able to copy the digital files should she attempt to 
do so, the DRM disables all products on her hard drive with known 
capability of copying music files. Later that day when she attempts to 
copy a recording of a meeting she attended in order to distribute it to the 
attendees, she is unable to operate her sound editing software and 
cannot understand why. Both of these consumers lost use of their 
systems for reasons unclear to them but clear to the creators of the code.  
2.  Information Security Harms 
From a consumer perspective, two primary information security 
harms can arise from the code. First, a consumer’s data can be stolen 
and used for fraudulent activity, including identity theft.15 Second, a 
consumer’s machine can be harnessed into an organized crime zombie 
bot army of commandeered computers that can be used to attack targets, 
including critical infrastructure.16 Organized crime syndicates have 
                                                                                                                     
 14. See Vista Copy Protection Is Defended, BBC NEWS, Jan. 22, 2007, http://news.bbc.co. 
uk/2/hi/technology/6286245.stm.  
 15. Identity theft threatens not only individual consumers’ finances but also threatens to 
undermine various social systems for administering benefits in the United States. For example, 
approximately one in seven adult social security numbers has already been compromised due to 
data breaches. Press Release, Gartner, Gartner Says Rash of Personal Data Thefts Shows Social 
Security Numbers Can No Longer Be Sole Proof of Identity for Enterprises (June 5, 2006), 
http://www.gartner.com/press_releases/asset_153141_11.html [hereinafter Gartner Press 
Release]. Consequently, these numbers will soon become an unusable method of authenticating 
U.S. residents for obtaining social services. See id.  
 16. For example, one Polish spam group uses over 450,000 compromised systems, “most 
of them home computers running Windows high-speed connections” all over the world. See, 
e.g., Ciphertrust, http://www.ciphertrust.com/resources/statistics/zombie.php (last visited 
August 16, 2006). The black market in security-compromised machines is an international 
market. See, e.g., John Leyden, Phatbot Arrest Throws Open Trade in Zombie PCs, THE 
REGISTER, May 12, 2004, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/05/12/phatbot_zombie_trade/. 
“The price of these BotNets (DoSNets) was roughly $500 for 10,000 hosts [during Summer 
2004] when the MyDoom and Blaster (the RPC exploit worm) first appeared on the scene.” Id. 
Non-exclusive access to compromised PCs sold for about five to ten cents each. Id. The greatest 
incidence of zombies is in the EU (26.16 per cent); the United States is second in incidence 
(19.08 per cent) and China is third (14.56 per cent). CipherTrust’s Zombie Statistics, 
CIPHERTRUST, http://www.ciphertrust.com/resources/statistics/zombie.php (last visited Oct. 6, 
2009) [hereinafter CipherTrust’s Zombie Statistics]; see also, Rise of Zombie PCs ‘Threatens 
UK’ , BBC NEWS, March 22, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4369891.stm. 
Approximately 250,000 new zombies are identified per day, see CipherTrust’s Zombie 
Statistics, supra, with approximately 100–150 million total zombies currently in operation, by 
5
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begun launching extortion rackets against businesses, threatening them 
with attacks from zombie drones.17 In fact, an army of zombie drones 
could be used to carry out an attack on electrical power infrastructure, 
disrupting service. According to the CIA, several power outages in 
multiple cities have been traced to cyberattacks.18 Therefore, machines 
within agencies and machines with critical infrastructure roles can 
inadvertently become controlled as part of a zombie drone army.19 
For example, perhaps our beleaguered consumer with the new CD 
with DRM also does not realize that the DRM in question is well-
known in the security community to compromise computers. By playing 
the CD, she also gives hackers access to her employer’s network to steal 
information and control her computer.20 Perhaps a consumer follows a 
banner advertisement to a job-seeker website that encourages 
consumers to deposit their resume in the website’s database. 
Meanwhile, the job-seeker website’s operator, unlike the consumer, 
knew that using the website was not safe because hackers were actively 
harvesting data from the database with the likely intention of 
committing information crimes.21 Or perhaps an email arrives from a 
                                                                                                                     
some expert estimates, see Tim Weber, Criminals ‘May Overwhelm the Web,’ BBC NEWS, Jan. 
25, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6298641.stm. 
 17. Joseph Menn, Deleting Online Extortion, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2004, at A1. This trend 
is concerning particularly because numerous U.S. federal agencies, including the Department of 
Homeland Security, have repeatedly failed cybersecurity review of the Government Accounting 
Office. Declan McCullagh, Homeland Security Flunks Cybersecurity Prep Test, ZDNET NEWS, 
May 27, 2005, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-142993.html. According to FBI sources, 
the Eastern European mafia views sending out emails as its “9 to 5 job.” Special Agent Thomas 
X. Grasso, Jr., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Address at DefCon 14: Fighting Organized Cyber 
Crime—War Stories and Trends (Aug. 3, 2006) (audio available at http://www.defcon.org/html/ 
links/dc-archives/dc-14-archive.html). 
 18. Tom Espiner, CIA: Cyberattacks Caused Multicity Blackout, CNET NEWS, Jan. 22, 
2008, http://www.news.cnet.com/2100-7349_3-6227090.html. 
 19. For example, a vulnerability in one software program required only that a consumer 
visit the attacker’s website to allow the attacker to exploit a hole in Internet Explorer and 
remotely compromise the consumer’s machine. Osdir/mail archive, Vulnerability in Step-by-
Step Interactive Training Allows Remote Code Execution (MS05-031), available at 
http://osdir.com/ml/security.securiteam/2005-06/msg00062.html. 
 20. See Bruce Schneier, Real Story of the Rogue Rootkit, WIRED, Nov. 17, 2005, 
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2005/11/69601. US-CERT, 
part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security advised consumers not to install software 
from an audio CD. See US-CERT, http://www.us-cert.gov/current/current_activity.html#xcpdrm 
(last visited May 2, 2006). 
 21. This example is based on a breach experienced by Monster.com and a compromised 
banner ad run by The Register. For a discussion of the Monster.com compromise, see, for 
example, Amado Hidalgo, A Monster Trojan, SYMANTEC CONNECT, Aug. 17, 2007, 
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/monster-trojan. For a discussion of The Register’s 
compromised banner ad, see, for example, Laura Rohde & Paul Roberts, Worm Hidden in UK 
Site’s Banner Ads, COMPUTER WEEKLY, Nov. 23, 2004, http://www.computerweekly.com/Artic 
les/2004/11/23/206959/worm-hidden-in-uk-sites-banner-ads.htm.  
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senator asking for financial support to appeal the result in a contested 
senatorial election; a consumer follows a link provided in the email to 
read more about the candidate and donate online. On the day the 
campaign sent the email, it, unlike the consumer, knew that the website 
was under attack22 and compromised. Because consumers visited the 
campaign website and donated, their credit card data may have been 
stolen23 and information criminals may have harnessed their computers 
into a network of remotely-controlled computers used for organized 
information crime.24  
3.  A Framework for Risks of Code Harm 
This knowledge imbalance between consumers and the creators and 
operators of code about functionality and information security harms 
hidden in code can be encapsulated by borrowing a framework from 
early information theorists Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver.25 Any 
information transmission, in this case data tethered to code, includes six 
elements: 1) a source; 2) an encoder; 3) a message; 4) a channel or 
                                                                                                                     
 22. Three types of attacks are possible: breaches of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. As used in this example, “attack” refers to a breach of confidentiality. 
Confidentiality violations refer to breaches where private data is accessible to unauthorized 
consumers. Integrity violations refer to violations where data is altered by unauthorized parties.  
Both confidentiality and integrity violations can result in the types of attacks leading to user 
harm. Availability attacks cannot.  An example of an integrity attack was the recent alteration of 
John McCain’s MySpace page by someone unaffiliated with the campaign in which an 
“official” message reversing the Senator’s position on gay marriage was posted. Michael 
Arrington, John McCain’s MySpace Page “Enhanced,” TECHCRUNCH, Mar. 27, 2007, 
http://www.techcrunch.com/2007/03/27/john-mccains-myspace-page-hacked/; see also 
Lieberman Campaign Website Hacked?, HOTLINE, Aug. 7, 2006, http://hotlineoncall.national 
journal.com/archives/2006/08/lieberman_campa.php. Attacks against availability refer to 
rendering a service or system inaccessible. For a discussion of availability attacks, see, for 
example, Eric Cole & Sandra Ring, INSIDER THREAT: PROTECTING THE ENTERPRISE FROM 
SABOTAGE, SPYING, AND THEFT 357 (2006).  
 23. This example is based on the data breach experienced by the campaign of former 
Senator Norm Coleman in his attempt to contest the election of Senator Al Franken. See, e.g., 
Elinor Mills, Coleman Senate Campaign in Donor Data Leak Mess, CNET NEWS, Mar. 12, 
2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-10195434-83.html. 
 24. This network of computers is comprised of “zombie drones.” Zombie drones are 
security-compromised machines that can be controlled remotely without the user’s knowledge 
for sending spam or other malicious purposes.  Thomas M. Dailey, Chair and President, U.S. 
Internet Service Providers Ass’n, General Counsel, Verizon Online, Testimony Before the 
Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census 
(June 16, 2004), available at http://www.usispa.org/pdf/USISPAPutnam.pdf; Primer: Zombie 
Drone, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2004, at F3.  
 25. ALEXIS TAN, MASS COMMUNICATION THEORIES AND RESEARCH 55 (2d ed. 1985) 
(“[A]n information source selects a message from a set of messages available to him or her. This 
message is changed by the transmitter into a signal, which is then sent over the channel to the 
receiver, which changes the transmitted signal back into the message and then sends it on to the 
destination.”). 
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medium; 5) a decoder; and 6) a receiver.26 
Source pertains to the creator or operator of the digital product. A 
source chooses whether to implement functionality limitation in a 
digital product. Functionality limitation is a popular business strategy 
for digital product producers, with the DRM industry alone earning 
around $1 billion in 2007.27 Similarly, any information security deficits 
in the creator’s or operator’s organization—the overall condition of 
information security of the speaker’s websites, databases, and 
operations—may impact the consumer.28 Source information risks are 
prevalent;29 in 2008, a 47% increase in data breaches occurred,30 
bringing the number of unique consumer records exposed in data 
breaches to more than 263,000,000.31 The encoding and decoding 
processes include risks consumers face related to code32 chosen by a 
creator or operator to convey data. If creators or operators choose to 
employ vulnerable code in data transmission, this choice can exacerbate 
security risks for consumers.33  
                                                                                                                     
 26. CLAUDE E. SHANNON &  WARREN WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF 
COMMUNICATION  18–26 (1949). Multiple types of information risks can coexist and overlap 
simultaneously. 
 27. Bharat Book Bureau: DRM Market Analysis—Future Directions, available at 
http://www.bharatbook.com/detail.asp?id=70004 (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
 28. Speakers who engage in vigilant information security monitoring of their systems are 
more likely to catch and patch vulnerabilities quickly in their systems when they occur. 
 29. More than 300 unique incidents of data compromise in 2006 alone resulted in 
exposure of more than 74,000,000 individual records of personally identifiable consumer 
information. See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches, 
www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm#2006 (last visited Oct. 5, 2009) [hereinafter 
A Chronology of Data Breaches]. For example, the list of entities known to have suffered 
information security breaches in 2006 alone included more than thirty universities, 
approximately 100 government agencies, more than twenty financial institutions, and two data 
brokers. Id. In particular, data was compromised in 2006 at the Department of Defense (DoD) 
and a DoD weapons research facility, the State Department, the Federal Trade Commission, the 
Department of Agriculture, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of Energy, the 
Navy, the Marines, the Army, the election boards, the Government Accountability Office, the 
Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Commerce, and 
the Transportation Safety Administration. Id
 30. Peter Dinham, Data Loss a Growing Concern Says CSC, ITWIRE, Mar. 15, 2009, 
http://www.itwire.com/content/view/23823/598/. 
 31. A Chronology of Data Breaches, supra note 29. 
 32. When I speak of code here, I refer to the choice of a digital medium or format and 
particular applications. 
 33. For example, unencrypted communication through a website or email is usually more 
easily intercepted and corrupted than encrypted transmissions, and courts have found that using 
certain browser protocols for data transmission exposes sensitive data to greater risk than 
necessary. In In re Pharmatrak, Inc., the First Circuit determined that the “get method of data” 
query and transmission exposed consumers of a medical search engine to unnecessary data risks 
because sensitive data was generated in the URL transmitted by the website to the consumer. 
329 F.3d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 2003). For example, email communications written in rich media 
8
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 Three major consumer security risks are message risks, medium 
risks, and receiver risks. Message risks describe a defect in a particular 
message such as sending malicious attachments. An imprudent creator 
or operator can damage a consumer through unintentionally sending 
viruses and other forms of malicious code attached to legitimate data.34 
New vulnerabilities are also frequently discovered in code associated 
with popular file formats,35 and these vulnerabilities in many cases 
require little action by the consumer to be harmful.36 Therefore, medium 
risks relate to vulnerabilities that arise at the interaction of the message 
and the network transmitting it. For example, a consumer can click on a 
link in an email and be redirected to an attacker’s website. On that 
website, the consumer may be tricked into entering information or 
otherwise harmed.37 Finally, receiver risks relate to the interaction of 
                                                                                                                     
formats such as HTML mean that merely opening or reading such an email presents an 
increased potential for system compromise or at least for significant data collection without the 
consumer’s consent. See generally Press Release, Microsoft, Goodbye, Spam: MSN Employs 
Innovative Technologies, Education to Reduce Unwanted E-Mail (May 8, 2003), available at 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2003/may03/05-08msnspamfilterpr.mspx.(discussing 
the privacy invasive potential of merely opening an email because of web beacons).  
 34. Even knowledgeable consumers may wrongly believe that a security compromise 
cannot result from opening an attached Microsoft Word document or an Adobe PDF file. For a 
description of one possible vulnerability in Microsoft Word, see, for example, United States 
Computer Emergency Readiness Team, Vulnerability Note VU#996892, http://www.kb.cert.org/ 
vuls/id/996892 (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). For a description of one possible vulnerability in 
Adobe PDF reader, see United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team, Vulnerability Note 
VU#689835, http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/689835 (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
 35. For example, code connected to viewing the .jpg format has been compromised. See, 
e.g., Microsoft, Security Bulletin, supra note 3, at Executive Summary. These formerly “safe” 
attachments now expose consumers to heightened security risks. In other words, merely viewing 
an image in an email can cause the code associated with the image to take control of a 
consumer’s machine and allow a remote party to use the machine to commit information crimes 
invisibly to the consumer. Thus, the process of opening .jpg image files has been compromised. 
Id. 
 36. In fact, although most malicious attachments require that a consumer open a malicious 
attachment to be compromised, this is not always the case. In some instances, merely opening an 
email without opening a malicious attachment could trigger a virus. If, for example, a bug in the 
email application existed or if the email client was configured to execute script automatically, 
simply viewing a message without opening a malicious attachment could be enough to trigger a 
virus. See, e.g., Microsoft Outlook Virus Gripes, COMPUTER GRIPES, http://www.computergrip 
es.com/Outlook.Viruses.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
 37. Hijacking is a common technique used in phishing attacks.  This type of attack may be 
either a URL redirection or a DNS hijacking. For a discussion of why consumers fall victim to 
phishing attacks, see, for example, Rachna Dhamija, J. D. Tygar & Marti Hearst, Why Phishing 
Works, available at http://people.seas.harvard.edu/~rachna/papers/why_phishing_works.pdf 
(Apr. 27, 2006). Similarly, attacks such as cross-site scripting and cross-site request forgery 
vulnerabilities, client-side state manipulation, and SQL injections present the next generation of 
attacks in Web 2.0 where consumers do not realize that the text before their eyes is engaged in 
invisible conduct behind their backs.  Currently, it is estimated that almost 30% of websites try 
to push malware onto the machines of visitors. Wolfgang Gruener, 29% of Web Pages Host 
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the prior elements with the consumer’s system—whether information 
vulnerabilities exist on the consumer’s system38—and the interactions 
of the functionality limitations built into the digital product by the 
source.  
Through both their websites and their online advertising, websites 
and online services subject users to source, encoding and message risks 
in their code.39 Shrinkwrap digital products that have an online 
component40 or online digital products that require a consumer to also 
download code locally expose consumers to these same risks as 
websites, plus additional receiver risks. Even shrinkwrap digital 
products with no Internet component subject consumers to receiver 
risks. In each case, an information imbalance exists in favor of the 
creator or operator: the creator or operator is in the best position to 
know the risks associated with their digital products at the point in time 
when harm to the consumer can be avoided.  
B.  Lack of Transparency 
In addition to the direct risks of code harm set forth above, it can be 
argued that another less obvious systemic legal risk has arisen due to 
code harms—a risk to the “white box” system model created by law to 
warn consumers about dangerous conditions. In software engineering, 
“white box” and “black box” refer to the level of transparency at the 
                                                                                                                     
Malware, Says Sophos, TG DAILY , July 25, 2007, http://www.tgdaily.com/content/view/33076/ 
108/. 
 38. For example, some senders choose to use security vulnerabilities as a means of 
pushing their communication to consumers. IBM Internet Security Systems, Security Alert: 
Vulnerability in Microsoft Windows Messenger Service, Oct. 15, 2003, http://www.iss.net/thre 
ats/156/html [hereinafter IBM, Security Alert]. In 2003, a vulnerability was discovered in an 
application installed by default in all Windows machines that permitted third parties to access an 
application on the computers of consumers with always-on Internet connections but no 
firewalls. Company Fights for Its Pop-Up Rights, WIRED, Dec. 9, 2003, available at 
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2003/12/61532 [hereinafter Company Fights for 
Pop-Up Rights]. Creator or operators began to push communication in the form of pop-up 
windows to such vulnerable consumers at unspecified times and regardless of whether a browser 
window was open. Id. Apart from consumers’ feelings of invasion, harm resulted from 
highlighting the existence of the vulnerability on these consumers’ machines. It allowed for 
compilation of a list of vulnerable consumers, a list that would have been desirable to 
information criminals. See, e.g., id.; Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 4, 
FTC v. D Squared Solutions, LLC, No. 03CV3108 (D. Md. Oct. 30, 2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/11/0323223comp.pdf; Robert Lemos, Spammers Slip Ads Through 
Windows, CNET NEWS, Oct. 17, 2002, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1001-962438.html; see also 
IBM, Security Alert, supra. Windows Messenger Service, which is distinct from Microsoft 
Corp.’s MSN instant messaging, is an application in Windows 95, 98, NT, 2000, and XP that 
enables spontaneous network communications from network administrators. See, e.g., Carnegie 
Melon University, Cert Advisory CA-2003-27: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Messenger 
and Exchange, Oct. 16, 2003, http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2003-27.html. 
 39. See, e.g., Company Fights for Pop-Up Rights, supra note 38. 
 40. For example, some shrinkwrap software requires online registration, “phones-home,” 
or includes Internet-based updating features.  
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processing point, the point where the analysis of input occurs to 
generate an output.41 A white box refers to a subsystem where the 
internal components are visible to the consumer, and the process of 
input analysis to generate output is clear.42 Most importantly, the 
internal processes are fully transparent to the user, and the user 
understands how everything works.43 A black box, on the other hand, 
refers to a process opaque to its consumer.44 It is a subsystem where no 
ability to monitor input analysis exists, and the way that the input 
generates the output is a mystery.45 In other words, the workings of the 
black box are not understood by the user.46  
The traditional legal conception of assessing consumer risk is 
predicated on transparency to consumers—a “white box”. Borrowing 
First Amendment terminology, this white box model can be called a 
“marketplace of ideas”47 where the consumers of products and services 
assess data regarding these products and services in a process where 
risks are fully transparent to them. Where these transparencies have not 
been adequate, the law has created additional duties of disclosure to 
enable better processing and risk assessment.48 Securities regulation 
disclosure,49 food and drug labeling,50dangerous product warnings,51 
“sin” product warnings,52 real estate settlement disclosure,53 and notice 
                                                                                                                     
 41. For a discussion of white versus black box processes, see, for example, Brian Bryson, 
Bridging the Gap Between Black Box and White Box Testing, IBM, June 28, 2003, 
http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/rational/library/1147.html. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). John 
Stuart Mill justified free speech by its greater likelihood of generating “the truth.” See, e.g., 
JOHN STUART M ILL , ON LIBERTY 45–47 (Oxford Univ. Press 1952) (1859). Alexander 
Meiklejohn’s “democratic self-governance” argument defends free speech as essential to 
collective self-governance. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 118 
(Harper & Bros. 1960) (1948). Further evidence of this thinking is found in Justice Brennan’s 
statements where he suggested that the ability to receive information and ideas is “an inherent 
corollary of the rights of free speech and press” because “the right to receive ideas is a necessary 
predicate to the recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political 
freedom.” Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982). 
 48. See infra notes 74–91 and accompanying text. 
 49. For a discussion of securities disclosure regulation, see, for example, Andrea M. 
Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate Information Security, and 
Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129, 155 (2005). 
 50.  For a discussion of food and drug labeling, see, for example, Krista Hessler Carver, A
Global View of the First Amendment Constraints on FDA, 63 FOOD &  DRUG L.J. 151, 152–59 
(2008). 
 51. For a discussion of labeling of potentially dangerous products, see, for example, John 
C. Monica, Jr., FDA Labeling of Cosmetics Containing Nanoscale Materials, 5 
NANOTECHNOLOGY L. &  BUS. 63, 69 (2008). 
 52. For a discussion of cigarette labeling, see, for example, Robert K. Hur, Takings, Trade 
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of nonobvious hazards in property54 are all examples of commercial 
situations where the law has corrected for information imbalances by 
requiring additional disclosure. This additional disclosure maintains the 
consumer’s ability to accurately process risks and rewards of potential 
transactions.55  
However, this calculus changes when data is accompanied by code. 
Because the ability of most consumers to obtain information about code 
is limited and the information is not readily available,56 the consumer 
can no longer accurately assess the risks of the data plus code 
combination. Yet, the two are packaged together or “tethered.”57 Stated 
another way, the system is shifting toward an opaque “black box” 
                                                                                                                     
Secrets, and Tobacco: Mountain or Molehill?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 447, 471–72 (2000). 
 53. For a discussion of disclosures in the context of real estate settlement procedures, see 
Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1, 60 (2009).  
 54. For a discussion of the disclosures a land possessor must make to visitors, see Mike 
Steenson, Peterson v. Balach, Obvious Dangers, and the Duty of Possessors of Land in 
Minnesota, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1281, 1283 (2008). 
 55. Putting this framework in First Amendment terms, because of the transparent, agentic 
construction of white box information processing we want to preserve, regulating certain topics 
of speech as inherently too controversial offends our understanding of free speech. S , e g., 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding unconstitutional a city ordinance 
banning certain categories of speech when based solely upon the subjects the speech addressed); 
see also Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of 
Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277 
1284 (2005) (arguing that “the distinction [between speech and conduct] . . . should be the one 
suggested by United States v. O’Brien and the other cases that distinguish content-neutral from 
content-based speech restrictions: Expression can generally be regulated to prevent harms that 
flow from its noncommunicative elements (noise, traffic obstruction, and the like), but not 
harms that flow from what the expression expresses.”). 
 56. Code is protected by copyright, in particular the anti-circumvention provisions of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United 
States and Europe, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 323, 331–32 (2004). Further, most users lack skill for 
circumvention. For a discussion of DMCA and DRM, see id. at 326–31 (2004) (arguing 
statutory limitations to the different means of DRM protection seem necessary); Dan L. Burk, 
Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 537, 538–39 (2005) (examining social costs of deploying digital rights management 
systems to protect copyrighted content); Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 575, 609 (2003) (arguing that with some adjustments, DRM technologies could be 
harnessed to protect privacy); Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Digital Rights Management: Many 
Technical Controls on Digital Content Distribution Can Create a Surveillance Society, 5 
COLUM. SCI. &  TECH. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2004) (arguing DRM could lead to a “surveillance” 
society and proposing eight policy principles to extend privacy protection to the distribution of 
digital media); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle: Disaggregating Fair 
Use from DMCA’s Anti-Device Provisions, 19 HARV. J.L. &  TECH. 111, 116–17 (2005) (setting 
forth a new administrative complaints procedure and suggesting that the nature and scope of the 
fair use doctrine needs to be more fully developed for the doctrine to be a meaningful part of 
copyright law in the digital age).  
 57. For a discussion of tethered products, see, for example, JONATHAN ZITTRAIN , THE 
FUTURE OF THE INTERNET: AND HOW TO STOP IT 101 (2008). 
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model from the consumer’s perspective, where consumers can no longer 
control or fully understand the risks involved in their commercial 
decisions about digital products. Currently no disclosure regime exists 
to correct this information imbalance. Nothing warns consumers about 
potential functionality harms and information security harms of the code 
before they use the data associated with the code. 
In other words, a transparency loss has occurred in the context of 
digital products.58 Whereas consumers could previously understand 
their information risk management end-to-end relatively well, 
consumers are now limited in their ability to do so because of code.59 
Explaining the shift a different way, using the language of 
communication theory, this shift represents the arrival of additional 
“noise” on the channel of communication.60 On the same channel, the 
consumer must now process not only the data but also the “noise” of the 
functionality risks and information security risks in the code tethered to 
the data.61  
C.  Lack of Feedback Loops 
Borrowing an insight from systems theory and cybernetics theory 
about the importance of feedback loops in systems for self-correction,62 
                                                                                                                     
 58. For a discussion of transparency, see generally Mark Fenster, Th  Opacity of 
Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885 (2006). 
 59. For a discussion of the risks of data security breaches, see, for example, Matwyshyn, 
supra note 49, at 136–46. For example, merely opening an email written in HTML can result in 
security compromise of a machine. For a discussion of various information security risks of data 
exchanges, see, for example, Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Of Nodes and Power Laws: A Network 
Theory Approach to Internet Jurisdiction Through Data Privacy, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 493, 512 
(2004). 
 60. For a discussion of Claude Shannon and noisy communication channels generally, 
see, for example, Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARV. J.L. 
&  TECH. 25, 41 (2002) (discussing inverse correlation between the signal to noise ratio and the 
width of the band of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation that encodes information); Kevin 
Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless Communication, 82 TEX. L. 
REV. 863, 874 (2004) (discussing the relationship between signal spread and interference on 
other signals and Shannon’s capacity theorem, which states that capacity of a communication 
channel is proportionate to the width of the channel and the transmission power used).  
 61. See generally Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of 
Information Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 495 (2004); Ellen P. Goodman, Spectrum Rights in the 
Telecosm to Come, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 269 (2003) (discussing government spectrum 
regulation); C.E. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYS. TECH. J. 
379 (1948), available at http://cm.bell-labs.com/cm/ms/what/shannonday/shannon1948.pdf 
(discussing consumer noise in the channel). For a discussion of Claude Shannon and the role of 
bits in communication theory, see, for example, Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: 
Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1109–10 (2003). 
 62. Feedback loops provide essential information to a system to allow for evolution and 
self-correction. For a definition of and discussion of cybernetics, see ARVID AULIN , THE 
CYBERNETIC LAWS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS 2–3 (1982); NORBERT WIENER, CYBERNETICS OR 
CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION IN THE ANIMAL AND THE MACHINE 19–20 (John Wiley & Sons, 
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one might argue that a feedback loop has already been created to 
address functionality harms and information security problems. 
Functionality is presumably described adequately in the end user license 
agreement accompanying the code, and many states have now passed 
data breach notification laws requiring notice to consumers whose data 
has been compromised in an information security breach.63  
Even assuming that consumers are capable of understanding the 
legal language of end user license agreements, an assumption which is 
not entirely clear,64 the goal of an end user license agreement is to 
protect the creator or operator, not to provide disclosure and warning to 
a consumer. One might similarly argue that data breach notices create 
an adequate feedback mechanism through compelled disclosure65 and 
already address the concerns regarding identity theft and information 
crime highlighted in previous sections of this Article.66 However, such 
arguments are incorrect; data breach notification statutes do not create a 
meaningful feedback loop for system self-correction. Data breach 
notifications currently cannot address two deficiencies. First, data 
breach notices come too late to prevent information security harm and 
do not prevent functionality harm. Second, they cannot teach a 
consumer how to avoid future harm.  
A data breach notification is a notice of potential harm that has 
already occurred. However, not all breaches of consumer information 
are discovered. The discovery of a breach may occur months or years 
after the creator or operator’s interaction with the consumer—or 
never.67 But assuming a data breach is discovered, statutory time frames 
                                                                                                                     
Inc. 1950) (1948); American Society for Cybernetics, Definitions of Cybernetics, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~asc/cyber_definition.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).  
 63. For a discussion of state data breach laws, see, for example, Paul M. Schwartz & 
Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 919–25 
(2007) (arguing in favor of creation of a coordinated response architecture and develops the 
elements of such an approach with a coordinated response agent that oversees steps for 
automatic consumer protection and heightens mitigation). 
 64. See Matwyshyn, supra note 1, at 535. 
 65. For a discussion of forced speech, see generally Martin Guggenheim, Stealth 
Indoctrination: Forced Speech in the Classroom, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57 (2004). 
 66. No specific avenues of legal recourse are available to harmed individuals to create 
incentives for speakers to implement better security practices in the future. Prior lawsuits have 
failed due in part to the difficulty in establishing legally adequate causality and damages in 
connection with a particular data breach leading to a particular incidence of identity theft. See, 
e.g., Kim Zetter, ID Theft Victims Could Lose Twice, WIRED, Feb. 23, 2005, 
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2005/02/66685. An FTC prosecution or state 
attorney general prosecution may occur; however, the frequency of such prosecutions is low due 
to limited agency resources. For a list of recent FTC prosecutions for weak information security 
practices, see Federal Trade Commission, Commission Actions, http://www.ftc.gov/os/action 
s.shtm (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
 67. For example UCLA has suffered data breaches which have included data of applicants 
from at least the previous eight  years. See, e.g., Dawn Kawamoto,  UCLA break-in puts data on 
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for notice of a security breach give a creator or operator that collects 
personally identifiable information as much as ten days or longer68 to 
report a breach from the time of discovery of a breach. Similarly, 
although the identity of the creator or operator is irrelevant from the 
standpoint of analyzing whether a communication will expose the 
consumer to additional information security risks, a portion of data 
breach notification statutes cover only for-profit entities.69 As discussed 
previously, some of the most severe data breaches involve 
governmental entities.70 Although this information is useful in 
mitigating information security damage after the fact, it does not help to 
prevent the consumer from unknowingly assuming the risk of harm 
beforehand, at a point when harm can be avoided. As pictured in Figure 
1, increased security risks occur simultaneously when interacting with 
code. 
 
Figure 1: Current Data Breach Feedback Loop Without Additional 
Warning  
                                                                                                                     
800,000 at risk, CNET NEWS, Dec. 12, 2006, http://news.cnet.com/UCLA-break-in-puts-data-
on-800,000-at-risk/2100-1029_3-6143003.html. 
 68. See, e.g., P.L. 1997, c.172, Assem. Comm. Sub. for Assem. No. 4001, 211th Leg. 
(N.J. 2005), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2004/ B.lls/A3500/4001_R1.PDF. 
 69. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-911  
 70. A case study of a recently compromised jobseeker website provides a clear illustration 
of the dynamics at issue. Monster.com was aware that hackers using stolen credentials were 
harvesting data from the Monster jobseeker database. Se  Monster.com Admits Keeping Data 
Breach Under Wraps, FOX NEWS, Aug. 24, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,2944 
71,00.html. These stolen credentials were then used, among other things, to send messages to 
the harmed jobseekers that purported to be from Monster.com and contained a malicious 
attachment. Id. Monster chose not to notify the impacted consumers until five days after the 
discovery of the security problem. Id. 
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First, data breach notifications are focused on solely source-related 
information theft harm; they do not address the information security 
source harms involving botnet capture, nor do they address functionality 
harms. Similarly, they do not consider the other points of risks, 
especially receiver risks. For example, if DRM code attached to a digital 
product disables anti-virus software and creates a backdoor on a 
consumer’s system, data breach notifications are inapposite.  
Second, security breach notifications do not teach consumers how to 
assess information risk prior to choosing business partners in the future. 
They also do not empower consumers to protect themselves against 
future code harms.71 As set forth in Figure 1, even presuming that 
sophisticated consumers are aware that they make information security 
decisions when they choose to access data, consumers are currently 
unlikely to connect the feedback from data breach notices with their 
ongoing decisions about the safety of interacting with code in the future. 
Although consumers may sever relationships with breached entities, 
consumers feel powerless in protecting themselves against data 
mishandling by other entities; they may begin to suffer from 
“notification fatigue” as numerous security notices describing past 
breaches arrive.72  
However, research indicates that consumers increasingly view 
creators and operators as having an obligation of stewardship to them.73 
A new approach is needed to buttress the data breach notification 
regime, one which provides disclosure at a point when consumers can 







                                                                                                                     
 71. Security breach notifications do, however, allow a consumer to sever a relationship 
with a creator or operator who has exposed the consumer’s information in this instance, and 
other consumers may choose to also avoid that company. See Three of Four Say They Will 
Stop Shopping at Stores That Suffer Data Breaches; Most of Those Surveyed Blame a 
Merchant When They Hear About a Data Breach, INFO. WEEK, Apr. 12, 2007, 
http://www.informationweek.com/software/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=199000563&cid=RS
Sfeed_TechWeb. 
 72. For a discussion of the possibility of national data breach notification legislation, see, 
for example, Grant Gross, Analysis: US Data Breach Notification Law Unlikely This Year, IDG 
NEWS SERVICE, May 8, 2006, http://www.macworld.com/article/50709/2006/05/databreach.ht 
ml.  
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III.   HOW TO WARN ABOUT CODE RISKS 
As the previous parts of this Article have explained, an information 
imbalance exists between consumers and the creators and operators of 
code. This imbalance is not new; it has existed in varying degrees from 
the early days of the Internet and has, in part, been the subject of several 
legislative efforts in the area of technology regulation. Although these 
regulatory efforts have correctly focused on improving information 
parity and consumer control, they have left gaps.  
One way to fill these gaps is by looking to other areas of law for 
models improving information parity. For example, tort law has crafted 
a “reasonable expectation of safety” to remedy the information 
imbalance in the relationship between possessors of the land and 
business visitors on the land. This reasonable expectation of safety 
involves a possessor’s duty to warn and protect the public and business 
visitors on land, as well as to promptly repair known conditions that 
may cause harm.  
A.  Lessons from Prior Technology Regulation 
Legislators have struggled with regulating digital products and the 
Internet. The law has never resolved whether digital products are goods 
or services, and the tension over this distinction has plagued regulatory 
efforts.74 Despite this, regulatory efforts in the realm of digital products 
to date have focused on improving two areas of concern regarding 
digital products—(1) improving information parity through data 
warning or “labeling” approaches and (2) improving consumer control 
over digital product relationships through data/code prohibitions driven 
by the identity of the creator or operator.  
1.  Improving Information Parity 
The data warning/labeling model75 has also been employed in the 
Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing 
Act (the CAN-SPAM Act),76 the Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
                                                                                                                     
 74. U.C.C. § 2B (Draft 1999), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/zrchives/ulc/uc 
c2b/2b299.htm. 
 75. This assumes data that was not itself criminal. Examples of criminal Internet content 
include content regulated under the Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2006).  
 76. 15 U.S.C. § 7705 (2006). It was passed by Congress in 2003, in the wake of perceived 
technological failure to curb the increasing amounts of email. Id. § 7701(a)-(b). A primary goal 
was to create national uniformity in legal regulation of email. Id. As of December 2003, thirty-
one states had laws regulating the transmission of email. See, e.g., Paul Queary, Redmond Man 
Wins Big in Spam Case, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 11, 2003, at E2, available at 
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20030911&slug=spam11; Paul 
Roberts, EarthLink Wins $16 Million in Spam Case, PC WORLD, May 7, 2003, 
http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,110627,00.asp. For a discussion of the preexisting 
relationship exemption of the CAN-SPAM Act, see, for example, Matthew B. Prince & Patrick 
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Act (COPPA)77 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA),78 and, most 
recently, state level spyware79 and data breach notification statutes.80 
Efforts to improve information parity in digital products began with 
attempts to create a Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) Article 2B81
and the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA).82 
UCITA seeks to ensure that all material terms of a digital product 
transaction are disclosed to a consumer,83 and it is intended to 
complement consumer protection law.84 In general, the CAN-SPAM 
Act compels truthful sender, subject, and content labeling by requiring 
that commercial email include the letters “ADV” in the subject line of 
the email85 and that sexually explicit materials are clearly labeled as 
such to warn a recipient about their prurient nature.86 COPPA, a 
corporate statute addressing child data collection, and GLBA, a 
corporate financial data handling statute, also both compel additional 
data labeling. For example, both statutes require that an operator of a 
website warn the consumer of the operator’s data practices through a 
notice of privacy practices. Specifically, the statutes require that a 
                                                                                                                     
A. Shea, After CAN-SPAM, How States Can Stay Relevant in the Fight Against Unwanted 
Messages: How a Children’s Protection Registry Can Be Effective, and Is Not Preempted, 
Under the New Federal Anti-Spam Law, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &  INFO. L. 29, 44–45 
(2003). 
 77. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2006). 
 78. Id. §§ 6801–6809 (2006). 
 79. For a discussion of spyware, see, for example, Susan P. Crawford, First Do No Harm: 
The Problem of Spyware, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1433, 1434 (2005). 
 80. For a discussion of state data breach notification statutes, see, for example, Schwartz 
& Janger, supra note 63, at 915. 
 81. These attempts failed. 
 82. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT (UCITA)  Prefatory Note (Proposed 
Official Draft 2001). The approach adopted by UCITA focuses on creating default licensing 
rules in line with the other provisions of the U.C.C., but it goes beyond Article 2 in buttressing 
public policy grounds for nonenforcement, prohibiting electronic self-help and excluding 
enforcement of prohibitions on reverse-engineering in some cases. Id.  
 83. See id. §§ 113, 114. 
 84. See id. § 104. However, despite its attempt to eliminate a portion of the information 
imbalances between creators and operators of digital products and consumers through disclosure 
and warning of material license terms, UCITA has not gained widespread adoption. Maryland 
and Virginia are the only states to have adopted UCITA. Ajay Ayyappan, UCITA: Uniformity at 
the Price of Fairness?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471, 2500 (2001). For a discussion of UCITA, see 
id. at 2472–74. 
 85. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7704(a)(5)(A), 7710(2) (2006). 
 86. Id. § 7704(d)(1). Similarly, each commercial email must contain information about 
how the consumer can opt-out from future mailings, in essence warning them that more email 
will arrive unless they opt out. Id. § 7704(a)(5)(A). Each of these requirements represents a type 
of labeling. The CAN-SPAM Act created a private right of action for Internet service providers 
(ISPs), but because the CAN-SPAM Act preempts most state spam statutes, in whole or at least 
in substantial part, it removed private rights of action granted by some state anti-spam statutes. 
Id. § 7707(h). 
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website collecting child87 and financial data,88 respectively, provide a 
link to a privacy policy which warns consumers about how data is 
collected, how it is used, with whom it is shared, and contact 
information for consumer questions.89 State level spyware statutes 
require obtaining consumer consent and prohibiting deceptive means 
when encouraging downloading.90 Finally, state level data breach 
notification laws also employ a model based on warning consumers 
about possible harm arising from a security breach: data breach 
notification laws require that an entity which suffers a security breach 
must notify potentially impacted consumers.91  
2.  Improving Consumer Control Over Digital Products 
CAN-SPAM,92 COPPA, and GLBA have additionally adopted an 
                                                                                                                     
 87. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2006). For a 
discussion of COPPA, see, for example, Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technology, Commerce, 
Development, Identity, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. &  TECH. 515, 541–48 (2007); Charlene Simmons, 
Protecting Children While Silencing Them: The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act and 
Children’s Free Speech Rights, 12 COMM. L. &  POL’Y 119, 120 (2007).  
 88. For a discussion of GLBA, see Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 
1230, 1241 (2002). 
 89. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6803(a) (2006). 
 90. For a list of spyware legislation by state, see Benjamin Edelman, St te Spyware 
Legislation, http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/legislation/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
 91. Currently, more than forty states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia have data 
security breach notification statutes on their books. Id.; National Conference of State 
Legislatures, State Security Breach Notification Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/pri 
v/breachlaws.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2009) [hereinafter NCSL, State Security Breach 
Notification Laws]. These notification statutes compel speech from entities who have suffered 
“data breaches” by mandating written notice to the consumers whose data has been impacted. 
Schwartz & Janger, supra note 63, at 915. The legislative intent driving data breach notification 
statutes involves preventing identity theft and generating a modicum of external accountability 
for data care. In requiring breached entities to warn consumers that their data has been 
compromised, legislatures have aimed to mitigate effects of identity theft. Id. at 917. By 
warning likely victims to check their credit reports more zealously, some instances of identity 
theft can be detected early. These state statutes vary in their definition of what constitutes a 
breach warranting notice, leaving discretion in some cases to the entity itself to determine 
whether the breach triggers the statute. For a list of state data breach notification statutes, see 
NCSL, State Security Breach Notification Laws, supra. For a discussion of state data breach 
notification statutes, see Schwartz & Janger, supra note 63. 
 92. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Alongi, Has the U.S. Canned Spam?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 263, 265 
(2004) (arguing that because of the international nature of spam, an international approach is 
most promising and that the efficacy of individual national measures is, as yet, unknown); J. 
Brian Beckham, Case Note, Intel v. Hamidi: Spam as a Trespass to Chattels—Deconstruction of 
a Private Right of Action in California, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &  INFO. L. 205, 226 
(2003) (arguing that an exception should be recognized by courts in actions sounding in trespass 
to chattels involving spam); Shelley Cobos, A Two-Tiered Registry System to Regulate Spam, 
2003 UCLA J.L. &  TECH. 5, 13 (2003) (arguing for a National Registry of Businesses to “serve 
as a single tracking source for businesses/individuals sending out mass commercial e-mail 
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approach partially rooted in data/code prohibitions. CAN-SPAM 
explicitly prohibits dictionary attacks,93 for example, and consumers can 
receive unsolicited communications only if the recipient has provided 
express prior authorization,94 if the communications are part of an 
ongoing transaction or relationship,95 or if the communications are not 
commercial.96 Similarly, COPPA prohibits a website operator from 
engaging in some97 digital communications98 with a child99 without 
prior, verifiable parental consent. GLBA limits a financial institution100 
from digitally communicating with consumers except to the extent 
required for completion of a transaction initiated by the consumer or as 
otherwise authorized by the consumer. 
In both legal scholarship and in the courts, digital products’ data and 
the commercial or noncommercial identity of the digital product creator 
or operator have been the primary focus of the debate, not the code 
underlying the visible data. In other words, digital products have usually 
                                                                                                                     
mailings”); Ben Dahl, A Further Darkside to Unsolicited Commercial E-mail? An Assessment of 
Potential Employer Liability for Spam E-mail, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &  INFO. L. 179, 
180 (2003) (arguing that “the proliferation of unsolicited commercial e-mail in the workplace 
means extra risk for businesses”). 
 93. Dictionary attacks are a type of attack where all possible combinations of passwords 
or randomly generated email addresses are used to attempt to gain access to a protected resource 
or an existing email account. See James Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 
YALE L.J. 1719, 1743 (2005). 
 94. For a discussion of the prior authorization in CAN-SPAM, see, for example, Edwin N. 
Lavergne, FCC Gives Teeth to the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. &  BUS. 861, 869 
(2005). 
 95. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7702 (2), (17) (2006).  
 96. See Chris Ulbrich, Spam Law Generates Confusion, WIRED, Jan. 26, 2004, 
http://www.wired.com/print/techbiz/media/news/2004/01/62031. To date, the Act has not been 
challenged on First Amendment grounds, in part because its restrictions are perceived to be 
easily circumventable and rarely enforced. 
 97. COPPA and its rules include exceptions to the prior parental consent requirement. It is 
not required in the following circumstances: when “an operator collects a child’s or parent’s e-
mail address to provide notice and seek consent;” when “an operator collects an e-mail address 
to respond to a one-time request from a child and then deletes it;” when “an operator collects an 
e-mail address to respond more than once to a specific request” and subsequently notifies the 
parent and gives the parent the opportunity to stop the communication before sending another 
communication to the child; when “an operator collects a child’s name or online contact 
information to protect the safety of a child who is participating on the site” and notifies the 
parent to provide the opportunity to prevent further use of the information; and when “an 
operator collects a child’s name or online contact information to protect the security or liability 
of the site or to respond to law enforcement, if necessary, and does not use it for any other 
purpose.” FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, DIRECT MARKETING ASSOCIATION, &  INTERNET 
ALLIANCE, HOW TO COMPLY WITH THE CHILDREN’ S ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT 1, 3, 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/idtheft/bus45.pdf. 
 98. COPPA covers operators of websites targeting children. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6502. 
 99. A child is statutorily defined as a person under the age of thirteen. Id. § 6501(1). 
 100. A “financial institution” is defined broadly in GLBA. See 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(k) (2009) 
(explaining the definition of a financial institution by giving examples).  
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been analyzed as static data, similar to postal mail advertisement. 
Although debate over the constitutionality101 and desirability102 of 
restrictions on data has arisen in the scholarly community, the U.S. legal 
literature has primarily conceptualized the issues around digital 
products as a limited problem of commercial speech.103 Meanwhile, 
courts104 have addressed challenges to both data labeling and data/code 
prohibitions cautiously and primarily in a First Amendment context, 
either failing to find state action105 or adopting an analysis under 
                                                                                                                     
 101. See generally Credence E. Fogo, The Postman Always Rings 4,000 Times: New 
Approaches to Curb Spam, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &  INFO. L. 915 (2000) (arguing that 
amending the junk fax law to cover Internet solicitations, or providing civil and criminal 
penalties for spamming will be the most effective method of curbing spam and the least 
vulnerable to First Amendment challenges); Seth Grossman, Keeping Unwanted Donkeys and 
Elephants Out of Your Inbox: The Case for Regulating Political Spam, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1533 (2004) (arguing that political spam can and should be regulated as part of a general 
measure restricting the use of all unsolicited bulk emails); Joshua A. Marcus, Note, Commercial 
Speech on the Internet: Spam and the First Amendment, 16 CARDOZO ARTS &  ENT. L.J. 245 
(1998) (arguing that regulating spam comports with the Central Hudson test and is needed 
because spam is not only annoying commercial speech but is also shifts the advertising cost to 
the consumer); Marc Simon, The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003: Is Congressional Regulation of 
Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail Constitutional?, 4 J. HIGH TECH. L. 85 (2004) (arguing CAN-
SPAM will be upheld as constitutional in light of First Amendment challenges); Mark Sweet, 
Political E-Mail: Protected Speech or Unwelcome Spam?, 2003 DUKE L. &  TECH. REV. 1 (2003) 
(arguing that regulation of commercial spam provides little precedent for regulation of political 
spam). 
 102. See generally Michael A. Fisher, Note, The Right to Spam? Regulating Electronic 
Junk Mail, 23 COLUMBIA J.L. &  ARTS 363 (2000) (arguing that it is likely that regulation of 
spam will ultimately take the form of rules regarding the labeling of electronic messages); Eric 
Goldman, Where’s the Beef? Dissecting Spam’s Purported Harms, 22 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER &  INFO. L. 13 (2003) (arguing that “most purported harms [of spam] are illusory 
[and are] already adequately addressed by existing laws or best left to market solutions”). 
 103. See generally Richard C. Balough, The Do-Not-Call Registry Model Is Not the Answer 
to Spam, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &  INFO. L. 79, 79 (2003) (arguing that the “differences 
between Internet spam and telephone telemarketing make an ‘opt-out’ Do-Not-Spam registry an 
impractical model”); Matthew B. Prince & Patrick A. Shea, After CAN-SPAM, How States Can 
Stay Relevant in the Fight Against Unwanted Messages, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &  INFO. 
L. 29 (2003) (arguing in favor of a child protection registry against spam); Cindy M. Rice, 
Comment, The TCPA: A Justification for the Prohibition of Spam in 2002?, 3 N.C. J.L. &  TECH. 
375 (2002) (arguing that amending the TCPA to incorporate spam is not the most effective 
method of spam regulation). In the EU, on the other hand, spam has frequently been 
conceptualized as a privacy question, pitting notions of individual privacy against freedom of 
trade. For a discussion of EU approaches to spam, see, for example, Lilian Edwards, Dawn of 
the Death of Distributed Denial of Service: How to Kill Zombies, 24 CARDOZO ARTS &  ENT. L.J. 
23 (2006). 
 104. Few communication cases have been fully litigated on First Amendment grounds. At 
least one settled during FTC prosecution. Ted Bridis, Small Company Fights Government 
Claims Over Ad-Blocking Software, INFO. WEEK, Dec. 10, 2003, available at http://www.infor 
mationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=16700049.  
 105. See, e.g., Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 456 (E.D.Pa. 
1996).  
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commercial speech106 standards set forth in Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.107 However, 
code that causes harm is not a problem limited to commercial creators 
or operators. As the list of entities who have suffered large scale data 
leakages set forth in Part II demonstrates, it is frequently nonprofit and 
governmental creators or operators who expose consumers to additional 
code harms.108  
Ultimately, the statutes that currently exist do not explicitly prohibit 
entities from knowingly or recklessly exacerbating consumer harm from 
digital products. The three hypothetical situations set forth in Part II 
involved three situations where a consumer is likely to experience 
information harm. In the cases of the doctor with strangely degraded x-
ray images and the consumer playing a CD at work, a creator or 
operator does not warn consumers about the risk of functionality harm 
and information security compromise associated with a shrinkwrap 
product. In the case of the jobseeker website and the political 
candidate’s website, a creator or operator encourages additional visitors 
during a time when it has actual knowledge hackers are stealing data 
from visitors. In still other cases, a creator or operator knows that 
merely accessing its website will compromise user machines.109 
                                                                                                                     
 106. White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 420 F.3d 366, 374 (5th Cir. 
2005); State v. Heckel, 93 P.3d 189, 190 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
 107. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (holding that a regulation which completely banned an 
electric utility from advertising to promote the use of electricity violated the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments and setting forth a four part test). For example, in White Buffalo 
Ventures, the Fifth Circuit performed a careful Central Hudson analysis and held that a state 
university’s anti-solicitation policy prohibiting unsolicited emails was a permissible regulation 
of commercial speech based on the university’s interest in protecting “user efficiency.” 447 U.S. 
at 374–76. On the other hand, the court held that the university had no adequate interest in 
“server efficiency” to warrant a restriction on commercial speech. Id. at 376. Consequently, the 
perspective adopted by the court was that these communications were unwanted speech that 
nevertheless potentially warranted some First Amendment protection as commercial speech; 
states were not free to restrict communication without careful consideration and justification. 
See id. at 378. The policy at issue in White Buffalo was deemed not preempted by the CAN-
SPAM Act. Id. at 369. As other cases fall outside the CAN-SPAM Act, it is likely courts will 
follow the lead of the Fifth Circuit in its Central Hudson analysis. In another case, a sender of 
communication sued AOL alleging that AOL’s blocking of communication constituted an 
infringement of First Amendment rights. Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. 
Supp. 436, 438 (E.D. Pa. 1995)  The court found in favor of AOL, based on the reasoning that 
AOL was neither an instrumentality of the government nor performed a traditional government 
function. Id. at 456. 
 108. For a recent compilation of breached entities, see A Chronology of Data Breaches, 
supra note 29. 
 109. For example, the Register.com security breach where a banner advertisement 
contained a malicious payload spread through merely through accessing the Register.com 
website would provide a possible Tier 3 situation. For a discussion of The Register’s 
compromised banner ad, see, for example, Laura Rohde and Paul Roberts, Worm Hidden in UK 
Site’s Banner Ads, COMPUTER WEEKLY, Nov.23, 2004, http://www.computerweekly.com/Artic 
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Currently, none of these situations are adequately addressed in 
legislation,110 and in none of these situations would a reasonable 
consumer consider the actions he or she was undertaking to be 
imprudent. But, in each situation, there was a harmful information 
imbalance between the creator or operator and consumers about the 
behavior of the code that could prove harmful to the consumer. 
Therefore, to prevent greater harm to the unassuming consumer, the law 
must remedy this information disparity lurking in the code underlying 
digital products. 
B.  Lessons from the Duty to Warn About the Condition of Land 
Once land ownership and agrarian production were primary 
sources of wealth and income in our 
economy . . . . Following the industrial revolution, 
manufactured goods assumed center stage . . . . Our 
economy has experienced another fundamental change, 
with information products and services now driving 
increased productivity and growth. Accompanying this 
change is a widely diverse and rich array of methods for 
distributing and tailoring digital information to the modern 
marketplace . . . .111 
As the quote above demonstrates, three distinct phases of 
commercial evolution have occurred in our legal history. The agrarian 
phase introduced a bundle of regulation connected to land and 
relationships around land and agrarian products; the second phase 
addressed manufactured goods; and we have now entered the phase of 
digital products. In each of the first two contexts—land and 
manufactured goods—duties to warn have been explicitly created by 
law to remedy information imbalances. Meanwhile, as discussed 
previously, technology regulation to date has tried to adopt an iterated 
approach, focusing on regulating information parity and improving 
consumer control in digital product relationships. However, information 
and control imbalances continue to exist between consumers and 
creators and operators of digital products.  
Part of the regulatory challenge arises because digital products exist 
in somewhat of a hybrid position between the first two legal contexts 
and contributes new risks. Similar to manufactured products, 
shrinkwrap digital products and Internet-based digital products such as 
                                                                                                                     
les/2004/11/23/206959/worm-hidden-in-uk-sites-banner-ads.htm. 
 110. At most, the jobseeker and political website hypotheticals may trigger a data breach 
notification several days after the compromise, at a time when the impacted consumers can 
neither protect themselves nor understand a clear connection between their behavior and the 
harm. 
 111. UCITA Prefatory Note (Proposed Official Draft 2001). 
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websites are used in locations physically remote from the original place 
of production. However, dissimilar to manufactured products in the 
stream of commerce, digital products increasingly retain an ongoing 
connection with the creator or operator. Even many shrinkwrap 
products require a registration process online to allow the consumer to 
receive ongoing updates. Website-based digital products involve 
returning to the same place—a website—repeatedly. Similarly, both 
land rights and digital product rights simultaneously involve tangible 
and intangible elements: land rights include visible land and invisible 
air and underground water; digital product rights include visible data 
and invisible code. In this way, it can be argued that digital products are 
now becoming more like land than manufactured products in some, but 
clearly not all,112 respects.  
The two foci of previous technology regulation—a focus on 
improving information parity and a focus on consumer control—gain 
potency when blended with an approach based on the tort duty to warn 
and protect visitors on land. The insights from the tort rules regarding 
visitors on land are three-fold. First, possessors of land must provide a 
reasonable expectation of safety on land held open to the public. 
Second, possessors have a duty to warn and protect visitors both before 
they enter and while they are on the land, especially if risks to their 
safety are not apparent. Third, possessors of land have a duty to repair 
their land from harming both their invitees and the adjoining land.  
1.  Reasonable Expectations of Safety: A Duty to Inspect 
The law involving both digital products and land includes the legal 
concept of licensees—people with a limited right to use. In tort law, the 
term “licensee” includes a subcategory of “invitees.”113 An invitee is a 
licensee to whom extra care is owed—either a member of the public114 
or a business visitor who is invited to enter, usually for a purpose 
connected with the business of the possessor of the land.115 For 
example, customers in stores are considered invitees.116 The possessor 
                                                                                                                     
 112. For example, unlike land, digital products are perfectly duplicable. 
 113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 330 cmt. a (1965). 
 114. When premises are held open to the public, those who enter for the purpose for which 
they are held open are invitees, even though their entry involves no possibility of business 
dealings with the possessor or of actual or potential economic benefit to the possessor. See, e.g.,
Price v. Cent. Assembly of God, 356 P.2d 240, 241 (Colo. 1960); Bunnell v. Waterbury Hosp., 
131 A. 501, 504 (Conn. 1925); Guilford v. Yale Univ., 23 A.2d 917, 918–19 (Conn. 1942); 
Howe v. Ohmart, 33 N.E. 466, 467 (Ind. App. 1893); Davis v. Cent. Congregational Soc’y, 129 
Mass. 367, 371–72 (1880); Geiger v. Simpson Methodist-Episcopal Church of Minneapolis, 219 
N.W. 463, 465 (Minn. 1928); Weigel v. Reintjes, 154 S.W.2d 412, 416 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941); 
Napier v. First Congregational Church of Portland, 70 P.2d 43, 44 (Or. 1937). 
 115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965). 
 116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 cmt. a (1965). Courts may vary regarding 
whether customers are classified as invitees who are members of the public or invitees or are 
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does not need to initiate an official invitation;117 the mere existence of a 
store gives the public reason to believe that the shopkeeper desires them 
to enter for the purpose of looking at goods and potentially buying 
them.118 
An invitee enters land and the premises upon it with an implied 
assurance of reasonable care in preparation for the protection and safety 
of the invitee119—a reasonable expectation of safety. Therefore, an 
invitee is not required to be on the alert to discover defects. The 
reasonable expectation of safety obligates the possessor not only to 
ensure reasonable protection for invitees120 against possible dangers of 
which the invitee is unaware,121 but it also includes a duty to protect the 
invitee against the risk of harm from activities about which the invitee 
knows but against which he may reasonably fail to protect himself.122 
2.  Reasonable Expectations of Safety: A Duty to Warn and Protect 
from Hidden Dangers  
As set forth above, a possessor of land is liable to his invitees for 
harms that violate the invitees’ reasonable expectation of safety.123 The 
possessor’s duty includes inspection124 of the premises to discover 
                                                                                                                     
business visitors. See id. 
 117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342 cmt. b (1965). 
 118. Whether an invitation has been extended turns on whether a reasonable person would 
understand the possessor to have expressed, through words or conduct, willingness for the 
public or a business visitor to enter. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 cmt. c (1965). The 
use of the land is often sufficient to determine the possessor’s willingness for the public and 
business visitors to enter. Id. Merchants generally believe that the presence of the public for any 
of these purposes tends to increase their business. Id.  
 119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 cmt. a (1965).  
 120. Invitees are entitled to a heightened duty as compared to other licensees. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 cmt. d (1965). Other licensees are entitled to expect 
that they will be placed upon an equal footing with the possessor by disclosure of any dangerous 
conditions known to the possessor. Id ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A cmt. B 
(1965).  
 121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 341A (1965).  
 122. See, e.g., Bearman v. Univ. of Notre Dame, 453 N.E.2d 1196, 1198. (Ind. Ct. App. 
1983) (finding that the plaintiff who was knocked down by an intoxicated fan in the parking lot 
after a football game was owed a duty of safety from the university, which was aware that 
alcoholic beverages were available at football games and that people became intoxicated and 
threatened the safety of others). 
 123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965). 
 124. In Guin v. Brazos Education, for example, the court focused on the fact that the 
defendant had followed the proper “process” through written security policies, had done current 
risk assessments, and had implemented proper safeguards as required by the GLB Act and found 
no liability for a breach that did occur. Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., Civ. No. 05-
668, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4846, at *18–19 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006). In the same vein, in Bell
v. Michigan Council, the court imposed liability where the defendant was aware of the security 
risk, but did nothing to address it. Bell v. Mich. Council 25, No. 246684, 2005 Mich. App. 
LEXIS 353, at *12, *15 (Mich. App. Feb. 15, 2005). 
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possible unknown defects,125 and, even in the case of a business visitor 
on residential premises, a duty to warn of these dangers.126 Similarly, 
this duty to warn127 and to reasonably protect invitees against physical 
harm extends to acts caused by the accidental, negligent, or 
intentionally harmful acts of third persons128 or animals.129  
For example, if a possessor expects or should expect from past 
experience that it is likely a third-party—either a careless actor or a 
criminal130—may endanger the safety of the invitee, the possessor may 
be under a duty to take precautions against it and provide reasonable 
safety, even if it means hiring additional staff.131 The manner in which 
                                                                                                                     
 125. See Dickey v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 146 A. 282, 283 (Md. 1929); Stark v. Great 
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 133 A. 172, 173 (N.J. 1926); Maehlman v. Reuben Realty Co., 166 N.E. 
920, 921 (Ohio Ct. App. 1928); Durning v. Hyman, 133 A. 568, 570 (Pa. 1926); Kallum v. 
Wheeler, 101 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1937). 
 126. See Jobe v. Smith, 764 P.2d 771, 771 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (finding liability where a 
refrigerator repairman was seriously injured in a client’s home when he was assaulted by the 
homeowner’s estranged boyfriend and stating that the homeowner had a duty to warn about a 
condition of the property and rejecting the homeowner’s assertion that she had no duty to warn 
because a business visitor on residential premises is not included among the special 
relationships imposing a duty to exercise care to protect against harm from others). 
 127. Even in the case of licensees, rather than invitees, a possessor duty to warn exists 
regarding hidden perils. See, e.g., Hicks v. Superstition Mountain Post No. 9399, Veterans of 
Foreign Wars of U.S., 601 P.2d 281, 284 (Ariz. 1979). 
 128. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 defines  
[t]hird persons” to “include all persons other than the possessor of the land, or 
his servants acting within the scope of their employment. It includes such 
servants when they are acting outside of the scope of their employment, as well 
as other invitees or licensees upon the premises, and also trespassers on the 
land, and even persons outside of the land whose acts endanger the safety of the 
visitor. The Section also applies to the acts of animals which so endanger his 
safety. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. B (1965). 
 129. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 states:  
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business 
purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the 
land for such a purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, 
or intentionally harmful acts of third persons or animals, and by the failure of 
the possessor to exercise reasonable care to (a) discover that such acts are being 
done or are likely to be done, or (b) give a warning adequate to enable the 
visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect them against it.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965). 
 130. The possessor does not have to have a particular third party in mind for the duty to 
pertain—a general category of individual is enough. Similarly, the possessor does not have to be 
able to foresee a particular time for the harm to occur; a general knowledge that harm is likely to 
occur at some point is enough for the duty to pertain. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 
cmt. f (1965).  
 131. Id. The Restatement comment provides the following example:  
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the harm occurs does not need to be foreseeable; the only question that 
matters is whether the source of the harm was foreseeable.132 For 
example, at least one court has held that a university must provide extra 
security after sporting events where alcohol is consumed because 
inevitably drunks will harm people in the parking lot.133 
In the case of suit for a failure to warn, a plaintiff invitee has the 
burden of proving that the defendant possessor either knew or had 
reason to know of the condition, or that by the exercise of reasonable 
care he would have discovered it. Where the condition is temporary, this 
burden may require proof that it has existed for a sufficient length of 
time that exercise of reasonable care would have led to its discovery.134 
3.  Reasonable Expectations of Safety: A Duty to Repair Promptly 
The possessor’s duty to warn and protect the invitee exists both 
before the invitee’s entry and during the entire time the invitee is on the 
land. Even after the invitee has entered, a possessor must also warn the 
invitee about any changes in the condition of the land that will create a 
risk of harm to the invitee. Invitees are entitled to expect safety not only 
in the conditions that exist before their arrival but also in the present 
condition and use of the land.135  
                                                                                                                     
At rush hours the passengers upon the A Street Railway Company are 
accustomed to crowd into the cars in a manner likely to cause injury to some 
one in the crowd. The A Company fails to provide a sufficient staff of guards to 
prevent this practice. B, a passenger, is hurt in such a rush, after a single guard 
has warned him of the danger. The A Company is subject to liability to B.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f, illus. 1 (1965). 
 132. For example, in Carey v. New Yorker of Worcester, Inc., the court held that the 
plaintiff, a patron in defendant’s bar, was entitled to recovery when a boy known to be underage 
and a troublemaker shot him. 245 N.E.2d 420, 422 (Mass. 1969). The court found the defendant 
to have violated the duty to warn the plaintiff, which existed even though the harm occurred in 
an unforeseeable manner. Id  
 133. Bearman v. Univ. of Notre Dame, 453 N.E.2d 1196, 1198 (Ind. Ct. App.1983).  
 134. See J.C. Penney Co. v. Norris, 250 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1957); Parks v. 
Montgomery Ward & Co., 198 F.2d 772, 775 (10th Cir. 1952); Oldenburg v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 314 P.2d 33, 37 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Frank v. J.C. Penney Co., 283 P.2d 291, 293 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Gold v. Ariz. Realty & Mortgage Co., 55 P.2d 1254, 1254 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1936);  Moran v. Gershow’s Super Mkts., Inc., 143 N.E.2d 723, 725 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1956); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Goldston, 155 S.W.2d 830, 831–32 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941). 
 135. See, e.g., Schwartzman v. Lloyd, 82 F.2d 822, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Johnston v. De 
La Guerra Props., Inc., 170 P.2d 5, 8–9 (Cal. 1946); Donahoo v. Kress House Moving Corp., 
153 P.2d 349, 355 (Cal. 1944); Greeley v. Miller’s, Inc., 150 A. 500, 501 (Conn. 1930); Rowell 
v. Wichita, 176 P.2d 590, 597 (Kan. 1947); Dean v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 300 S.W.2d 431, 434–
35 (Mo. 1957); Philpot v. Brooklyn Nat’l League Baseball Club, Inc., 100 N.E.2d 164, 167 
(N.Y. 1951); Cejka v. R.H. Macy’s Co., 155 N.Y.S.2d 565, 568 (Sup. Ct. 1956), rev’d on other 
grounds, 162 N.Y.S.2d 207 (App. Div. 1957), aff’d, 149 N.E.2d 525 (N.Y. 1958); Kmiotek v. 
Anast, 39 A.2d 923, 924–25 (Pa. 1944); Lee v. Nat’l League Baseball Club of Milwaukee, 89 
N.W.2d 811, 816 (Wis. 1958). 
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Similarly, a possessor is not allowed to condone disrepair of the 
property caused by invitees or even trespassers.136 Harm that occurs to 
adjacent properties because of disrepair on the possessor’s property is a 
basis for liability for the possessor.137 For example, in one case the 
defendants acquiesced in the use of diversion banks on their land as a 
raceway for motorcyclists.138 During heavy rainfall, neighboring land 
was damaged by a mudslide due to the failure of the damaged diversion 
banks.139 Although the harm to the diversion banks on the defendants’ 
property was caused by third parties, the defendants’ failure to repair 
provided a basis for an Iowa court to deem the defendants liable for 
harm caused on an adjoining property.140  
These three insights from the relationship between possessors of 
land and invitees—a reasonable expectation of safety, a duty to warn, 
and a duty to promptly repair—may prove useful additions to the way 
we conceptualize harms from digital products. This type of blended 
approach must start from the premise of mitigating digital harms as 
consumers experience them, rather than from a focus on the identity of 
creators or operators or how the harm is technically caused.141  
C.  Reasonable Expectation of Code Safety: A Three-Tiered Duty to 
Warn and Repair 
In the subsections that follow, this Article proposes and defends a 
“reasonable expectation of code safety”—a three-tiered regulatory 
approach inspired by systems theory142 and the land-based duty to warn.  
                                                                                                                     
 136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 365 (1965) (“A possessor of land is subject 
to liability to others outside of the land for physical harm caused by the disrepair of a structure 
or other artificial condition thereon, if the exercise of reasonable care by the possessor or by any 
person to whom he entrusts the maintenance and repair thereof (a) would have disclosed the 
disrepair and the unreasonable risk involved therein, and (b) would have made it reasonably safe 
by repair or otherwise.”). 
 137. See, e.g., Young v. Marlas, 51 N.W.2d 443, 448 (Iowa 1952); Crow v. Colson, 256 P. 
971, 973 (Kan. 1927); Bernard v. Brownell, 173 N.E. 434, 435 (Mass. 1930); McCarthy v. 
Thompson Square Theatre Co., 150 N.E. 170, 170 (Mass. 1926); Mullen v. St. John, 57 N.Y. 
567, 572 (1874); Pearson v. Ehrich, 133 N.Y.S. 273, 274 (App. Div. 1912); Restaino v. Griggs 
Motor Sales, Inc., 193 A. 543, 544 (N.J. 1937); Smith v. Claude Neon Lights, Inc., 164 A. 423, 
425 (N.J. 1933); Klein v. Price, 65 P.2d 198, 199 (Okla. 1936); Pope v. Reading Co., 156 A. 
106, 109 (Pa. 1931); Sakach v. Antonoplos, 148 A. 58, 60–61 (Pa. 1929); Hester v. Hubbuch, 
170 S.W.2d 922, 927 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1942). 
 138. Schropp v. Solzman, 314 N.W.2d 413, 414 (Iowa 1982). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 415. 
 141. As discussed in Part II.C., data breach notification statutes fall short in part because 
they are primarily focused on commercial entities, ignoring the identical problems caused by 
nonprofit and government speakers. 
 142. Systems theory examines the dynamic information processing and evolution of 
systems. All systems have common elements of input, output, throughput or process, feedback, 
control, environment, and goal. See, e.g., Institute for Systems Theory and Automatic Control, 
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Similar to the land-based duty to warn, the reasonable expectation of 
code safety remedies the information imbalance between the “invitee” 
consumers, on the one hand, and the “possessor” creators/operators of 
digital products, on the other. The reasonable expectation of code safety 
entails three duties: a duty to inspect, a duty to warn of digital harm, and 
a duty of code repair.  
1.  The Reasonable Expectation of Code Safety 
As discussed in Part II, data today presents serious non–expressive, 
incidental risks for the consumer because of tethered code, and these 
functionality and information security risks arise invisibly when a 
consumer accesses the data. A serious information imbalance about this 
code exists between the creators and operators of code and consumers. 
By creating a preemptive duty to warn, such as the one that exists in the 
relationship between possessors of land and invitees, consumers can 
access a strong feedback loop. Thus, consumer protection legislation or 
regulatory action is needed to address the relationship between 
consumers and the creators and operators of code who knowingly143 
expose consumers to increased functionality and information security 
risks.  
Borrowing the idea of crafting a reasonable expectation of safety 
from the land-based regulatory approach explained in the previous 
section, it is easy to extrapolate the idea of a “reasonable expectation of 
code safety.” Like the reasonable expectation of safety connected with 
invitees on land, the reasonable expectation of code safety would be 
composed of three component parts—a duty to inspect code prior to 
release, a duty to warn of any hidden risks in the code both before 
purchase and after purchase, and a duty to repair problems with the code 
promptly.  
Prior to the release of code, creators or operators should be prepared 
to attest that to the best of their knowledge and in accordance with 
reasonable levels of care, the code is safe for consumer use. This duty to 
inspect does not require creators or operators to represent and warrant 
that their code is error-free, only that they have inspected the code to the 
best of their ability and in accordance with reasonable industry norms. 
Numerous code tools are available, many at no cost, that enable creators 
and operators to better inspect their code for obvious flaws.144 Some 
                                                                                                                     
Universität Stuttgart, Systems Theory, http://www.ist.uni-stuttgart.de/research/projects/Syste 
msTheory/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2009). 
 143. “Knowingly” here can refer to any standard of knowledge determined by a state, 
provided that liability is not imposed without fault.  
 144. For example, Microsoft recently released a free tool to help detect and prevent SQL 
injections. Posting of Ryan Naraine to Zero Day, http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1336 (June 
24, 2008, 13:34 EST). 
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creators and operators simply choose not to take the time to use these 
tools in order to “ship” product more quickly.145 Further, creators and 
operators should ensure that their code does not contain “legacy” 
problems of prior versions of code that are known to contain exploitable 
vulnerabilities, which may have gone undetected and unfixed.  
Second, the reasonable expectation of code safety includes a duty by 
the creators or operators of code to warn of hidden risks and 
vulnerabilities about which they know or should know in their code, 
both before the consumer uses it and even after the consumer’s first use. 
Consumers cannot assess the safety of the code before interacting with 
it, nor can they tell if the code has become unsafe after they have 
purchased it and started to use it. Most importantly, the creator or 
operator is in the best position to warn consumers of functionality risks 
and vulnerabilities and other information risks. This type of warning 
would dramatically improve the information imbalance between 
consumers and the creators and operators of code. Conversely, a lack of 
warning presents a serious policy concern: much like a possessor who 
encourages invitees, without informing them of the crumbling stairs 
inside, to enter into his condemned building where no one will hear 
their cries for help, a creator or operator who encourages consumers to 
interact with dangerous computer code draws consumers into a situation 
likely to harm them.  
Finally, just as a duty to repair land during the stay of invitees 
pertains to possessors, so too a duty of code repair can mandate prompt 
correction of problems in code. Some creators or operators of code wait 
until the last possible (legal) moment before notifying consumers about 
data breaches, even if others are harmed in the interim.146 Similarly, 
some creators and operators are lackadaisical about fixing 
vulnerabilities in their code and ignore consumer requests for 
information about the status of security vulnerabilities.147 Sometimes 
they even release patches that exacerbate rather than fix problems.148 No 
                                                                                                                     
 145. For a discussion of the pressure to ship, see, for example, CEM KANER, SPECIAL 
LIBRARIES ASS’N, BAD SOFTWARE 2 (1999), available at http://www.kaner.com/pdfs/SLAbadS 
W.pdf.  
 146. For a discussion of the Monster.com compromise, see, for example, Hidalgo, supra 
note 21. 
 147. For example, American Express has been slow to correct security problems on its 
consumer-facing website and was taken to task by the press. S e, e.g., Dan Goodin, American 
Express Bitten by XSS Bugs (Again): Card Accounts Still Naked, THE REGISTER, Dec. 20, 2008, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/12/20/american_express_website_bug_redux/. Requests for 
more information from cardholders regarding the status of the security corrections to the website 
were ignored by the company. See Communication Between Andrea Matwyshyn, American 
Express Cardholder, and American Express (Jan. 11, 2009) (on file with author).  
 148. See Team Register, SonyBMG Backtracks on Buggy Bug Fix: Wearing Out the 
Rewind Button, THE REGISTER, Dec. 9, 2005, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/12/09/sony_me 
diamax_problems/. 
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uniform legal approach or business norm exists on the point of fixing 
vulnerabilities.149 Through creating a duty to repair code promptly, the 
risks faced by consumers who continue to use the digital product in 
question are mitigated.  
2.  A Three-Tiered Approach 
To operationalize the reasonable expectation of code safety proposed 
above, a state legislature150 or perhaps the Federal Trade Commission, 
pursuant to its authority under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act,151 may adopt an approach composed of three tiers of responses to 
code that is likely to expose consumers to functionality or information 
security risk:152 (1) a labeling approach for known functionality 
limitations and periods of low-risk vulnerabilities; (2) a hybrid approach 
of labeling and code prohibition during periods of medium risk 
vulnerabilities; and (3) a code prohibition approach during the time 
between discovery and patching of high-risk, critical vulnerabilities.  
For information security harms, the tier categorization of 
vulnerabilities and responses would be determined on a sliding scale 
basis using an “information security code risk scale” modeled on threat 
                                                                                                                     
 149. See, e.g., Patrick S. Ryan, War, Peace, or Stalemate: Wargames, Wardialing, 
Wardriving, and the Emerging Market for Hacker Ethics, 9 VA. J.L. &  TECH. 7, ¶ 3 (2004) 
(discussing the application of laws and business standards to hacking).  
 150. Implementing the information security risk scale approach on the state level brings 
pragmatic benefits. First, state legislatures tend to work more quickly than Congress in 
addressing novel problems of law and technology. When Congress acts, harmonization of state 
statutes results in a lower level of consumer statutory recourse, as demonstrated by the CAN-
SPAM Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–13 (2006) (discussing regulations regarding email). Second, 
as the history of data breach notification statutes demonstrates, if a large state such as California 
passes a consumer protection statute impacting online communications, it is likely that this 
higher level of care will become the new norm of conduct. For example, maintaining a separate 
website for all California residents and a second website for all residents of other states would 
generate additional costs and inefficiencies. Finally, waiting for common law to emerge to 
address information harms is a losing proposition. Even assuming the glacial pace of common 
law development in this area could be tolerated, unresolved doctrinal questions regarding 
causation in data harm contexts and calculating damages for information harms would present 
courts with potentially intractable problems certain to cause disagreements among judges. 
 151. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006) (discussing the authority of the Federal Trade 
Commission). 
 152. For companies with a de minimis number of consumers using their digital products, an 
exemption should be considered. Similarly, this framework is intended to apply to all creators or 
operators who receive consideration for their digital products. In other words, an open source 
product would not fall under this approach, but a “free” software product that comes tethered to 
advertising software that tracks users would be covered: the tracking in question generates 
information which constitutes a thing of value obtained in a bargained-for exchange. Further, 
companies can choose to discontinue products and thereby no longer be held to a reasonable 
expectation of code safety for that product. However, so long as copies are sold by the creator or 
operator, the expectation remains and clear notice of impending end of life must be included as 
a functionality limitation on the product to provide consumers with opportunity to adjust.  
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model153 factors derived from norms of the information security 
industry. These factors would include: (1) the sophistication of the 
attack, (2) the severity of harm resulting from compromise, (3) the 
extent of user interaction required for triggering compromise, (4) the 
extent to which an attack is currently being leveraged or a 
commoditized exploit is available in the opinion of information security 
experts, and (5) the number of consumers potentially impacted. During 
periods of known vulnerability, a creator or operator can be statutorily 
required to perform an information risk calculus154 prior to engaging in 
technology mediated code. For example, assigning a ten point scale to 
each of the five elements set forth above, the creator or operator would 
generate a risk score by obtaining an average score of the values for 
these five categories.155 An average score under three may trigger a Tier 
1 labeling response, an average score between three and six may trigger 
a Tier 2 hybrid response, and an average score over six requires a Tier 3 
code prohibition response until the security vulnerability is fixed.  
a.  Tier 1: Labeling 
The lowest level of protection, warning, and repair involves labeling 
through a “safety notice.” Safety notice labeling should occur in a 
situation where (1) a digital product is known to cause or is likely to 
cause functionality harms to other digital products that a consumer may 
use or (2) information security problems or other risks exist in code, but 
the threat modeling indicates that the situation is low-severity and does 
not place consumers in imminent danger. The perspective adopted in the 
safety notice should be that of the consumer: the information in the 
notice should enable a consumer using the digital product to reasonably 
protect herself against known or possible harms.156 Thus, the key 
                                                                                                                     
 153. For an in-depth description of threat modeling process, see, for example, Microsoft 
Security Developer Center, Threat Modeling, http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/aa5704 
11.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).  
 154. Statutorily requiring that an individual or entity engage in a risk calculus is not a novel 
approach. For example, under federal and state securities regulation, public companies are 
regularly asked to conduct analyses of “materiality” of events and the likelihood of events to 
impact future earnings. For a discussion of materiality determinations see, for example, Richard 
C. Sauer, The Erosion of the Materiality Standard in the Enforcement of the Federal Securities 
Laws, 62 BUS. LAW. 317, 317 (2007). 
 155. The ten point scale for each of the five elements would consist of: sophistication (1 = 
low, 10 = highly complicated), severity (1 = low, 10 = remote compromise), triggering (1 = 
extensive interaction, 10 = minimal), urgency (1 = as soon as feasible, 10 = immediately above 
all other priorities), impact (1 = a negligible number of consumers, 10 = 100% of consumers). 
 156. For example, if a security issue exists in a browser and a website expects that a sizable 
portion of their visitors use this browser, the website’s safety notice should provide a brief 
explanation of the urgency of patching the browser and provide a link to assist the consumer in 
doing so. Or, for example, a website knows that it has become a favorite target of phishing 
attempts on its customers. This safety notice would also be a place to explain phishing to 
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question the safety notice answers is: “what would a reasonable 
consumer want to know about this digital product and its impact on her 
system and the security of her information?” The presentation of the 
safety notice should be as consistent as possible across all digital 
products157 to help consumers observe and read the notice more 
readily.158 It can be divided into two sections—one on source risks and 
one on receiver risks.  
The source risks section would describe information the consumer 
needs to know about the status of the security of the source. 
Specifically, two pieces of information are critical: the number of 
known data breaches the organization experienced in the last year, and 
whether there is an active patching underway for a vulnerability. In 
practice, all websites will likely carry safety notices on a permanent 
basis. Because information security is an ongoing process,  websites and 
the organizations behind them commonly engage in regular system 
updates and security improvements for noncritical issues.159 For 
example, security patches to Microsoft products are released on the 
second Tuesday of every month.160 Provided the patches on a particular 
Tuesday relate to unsophisticated, hard to trigger vulnerabilities that are 
likely to impact only a small portion of consumers and cause minimal 
damage, a security notice on a website during the updating period 
would state “We are currently patching our system.” Email, website 
pages, and other communication should provide clear and conspicuous 
notice to the consumer that by choosing to interact with the creator or 
operator prior to completion of these regularly scheduled or other 
updates, the consumer may be exposed to additional risks. Seeing this 
notice, a cautious user may choose not to interact with the code and the 
digital product until such time as the fix is completed.  
The receiver risks section of the security notice would explain to 
consumers the possible consequences to their system of using the digital 
product, such as degraded images in other programs as the doctor 
incurred with degraded x–rays, and advise them of any prudent 
                                                                                                                     
consumers, its dangers, and how to best avoid falling victim.  
 157. Part of the reason behind consumers’ failure to read privacy policies may stem from 
their extreme levels of heterogeneity in content and presentation. 
 158. On websites, for example, the presentation could be a link in a yellow box in the upper 
right hand corner of a website that says “Safety Notice” and links to a notice that informs the 
consumer why a security issue exists in the way that the consumer may be using the website. 
The format should be consistent across all websites to enable consumers to train themselves to 
notice and review these notices. On a shrinkwrap product, a sticker explaining the functionality 
limitations should be placed in the upper right hand corner of the product.  
 159. See, e.g., Brian Krebs, Monthly Microsoft Patch Release Won’t Include Word Fix, 
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 8, 2006, http://blog.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2006/12/monthly_ 
microsoft_patch_releas.html. 
 160. Id. 
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protections, such as newly released patches to common products. In the 
context of shrinkwrap products, any product with DRM would carry a 
safety notice. For example, some shrinkwrap products may create a 
permanent “phone home” link with their creators and operators after 
installation. This type of constant data transfer uses the consumer’s 
Internet connection, usurps memory by running constantly in the 
background, and is likely to increase the likelihood that the computer’s 
machine will run more slowly and that her operating system will crash 
more frequently. These reasonably predictable interactions should be 
listed on a safety notice warning sticker on the front of the product; the 
consumer should be able to review this information prior to purchase.161  
b.  Tier 2: Hybrid Labeling and Code Prohibition 
In a situation where the operative threat modeling factors indicate a 
security problem of medium severity, the creator or operator should 
refrain from all “pushed” communications. Meaning the creator or 
operator should operate under a prohibition on reaching out to 
consumers through new advertisements, email campaigns and the like. 
Additionally, the creator or operator should conspicuously label with 
the safety notice described above all “pulled” communications and 
digital products, such as websites or compact discs, that a consumer 
may seek out independently. In this way, no new consumers are 
encouraged into a potentially dangerous situation and those consumers 
who choose to interact without encouragement are suitably warned of 
the risks.162  
c.  Tier 3: Code Prohibition  
In a situation where threat modeling reveals a critical, severe 
security issue or an active exploit underway,163 all communication 
should stop immediately and the digital products should be removed 
from consumer access.164 For example, if merely visiting a website 
results in immediate compromise of user machines, the website should 
be taken down until such time as a consumer can safely interact with it. 
Until the security problem is remedied, allowing consumers to interact 
                                                                                                                     
 161. This approach is also similar to the requirement that pharmaceutical companies 
disclose known negative side-effects of various drugs on warning labels. 
 162. For example, the Monster.com security breach would provide a possible Tier 2 
situation. For a discussion of the Monster.com compromise, see, for example, Hidalgo, supra 
note 21. 
 163. An active exploit usually triggers a need for a “hot fix.” A hot fix is an information 
security term for a security vulnerability correction that needs to be done immediately due to the 
severity of the threat. See, e.g., Yahoo! Answers, What Is Hotfix Why Are There So Many 
Installed in My Programs Do I Need Them??, http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=2 
0060723191022AAzC1bE (last visited Oct. 4, 2009). 
 164. In the case of a website, if the exploit is limited to a containable section of the site, the 
remainder of the site can continue to operate.  
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with the website exposes these consumers to information harm. The site 
should be replaced with a non-interactive notice: “Safety Notice: Please 
return another time.” Similarly, if a digital rights management 
application on a shrinkwrap product results in immediate compromise 
of consumer machines, it should be pulled off the shelves. Advertising 
and all other communications connected to the website should be tabled 
until the information security problem is resolved.165 For example, 
turning to the case of the jobseeker website described in Part II, this 
type of a code prohibition would be appropriate. Because hackers are 
actively pillaging information from the contents of the website 
databases, any visitor who deposits a resume is at risk of being 
victimized by an exploit in progress simply by using the website as 
intended. At a minimum, the sophistication of the attack was high, 
urgency was high, and a large portion of consumers was impacted.  
3.  The Consequences to Code Creators and Operators 
The reasonable expectation of code safety embodied in the three-
tiered model is itself modeled directly on corporate best practices for 
handling information security issues. Therefore, a regulatory approach 
constructed in this manner would not generate excessive burdens for 
organizations already engaged in rigorous information risk 
management. The only creators or operators burdened would be those 
who offer digital products that do not comport with industry best 
practices.  
Creating a duty of code inspection by adopting this framework into 
law would grant legal validation to the efforts of organizations already 
proactively including strong consumer transparency and information 
security processes into their risk management planning and product 
development.166 Minimizing functionality disruption of other code and 
ensuring effective information security are increasingly viewed as a 
competitive advantage by major technology companies;167 however, 
especially the importance of rigorous information security is not 
universally understood at this juncture. In particular, market forces will 
not dramatically improve security in the public sector.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 165. For example, the Register.com security breach, where a banner advertisement 
contained a malicious payload that spread merely through accessing the Register.com website, 
would provide a possible Tier 3 situation. For a discussion of The Register’s compromised 
banner ad, see, for example, Rohde & Roberts, supra note 21.  
 166. The organizations most likely to object vociferously would be those seeking to hide 
the inadequacies of their existing information security management structures and the extent to 
which they carelessly put consumers at risk of information security harms.  
 167. See, e.g., Microsoft Corporation, Windows Vista: Learn About the Features: Safer, 
http://www.microsoft.com/singapore/windows/products/windowsvista/features/safer.mspx (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2009). 
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Creating a duty to warn of code harm would immediately improve 
the information parity between consumers and the creators and 
operators of code. Useful information would arrive at a point in time 
when the consumer can still choose not to interact with the code. This 
type of a real-time feedback loop would put consumers on notice of the 
existence of possible functionality or security risks or other problems 
involved with choosing to use the creator or operator’s code. Public 
disclosure of ongoing functionality and information security problems 
through an additional information feedback loop will encourage creators 
or operators to engage in more careful code creation and to fix security 
problems more quickly to avoid public embarrassment. 
Particularly if coupled with a mandatory audit regime, creating a 
duty of code repair would ensure that errors exposing consumers to 
information risk would not be ignored. A repeated code problem would 
carry consequences for the creator or operator through legal action, 
either from an agency or the public. Further, because repairs are always 
more costly than creating good code on the front end, financial 
incentives would be put in place for better quality code writing in the 
first instance.  
As shown in Figure 2, functionality limitations and information 
security concerns are likely to be better incorporated into overall 
consumer processing where multiple sources of feedback concurrently 
exist to help the consumer assess the safety of digital products. The 
safety notice information will assist consumers in determining whether 
a digital product is safe before the consumer’s initial interaction. As 
such, consumer decision-making would begin to shift back toward a 
white box model.  
 
Figure 2: Data Breach Notice Feedback Loop with Prior 
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In particular, with the addition of a real-time feedback loop about 
creator or operator security, data breach notices would become more 
effective. Consumers would be able to more easily cognitively connect 
the information about a previous breach with their decision-making 
about future information security behaviors. They may learn to consider 
security in their communication interactions prior to exposing 
themselves to additional information security risks in the future.168 
Consequently, consumers may become better able to prevent their own 
future data compromises.  
Part IV, which follows, addresses the primary objection associated 
with the approach proposed in Part III—a potential tension with the 
First Amendment. However, as Part IV explains, a regulatory approach 
focused on the incidental effects of data tethered to code comports with 
United States v. O’Brien169 and does not offend the First Amendment. 
Where the data at issue, regardless of content, through its tethered code 
increases functionality harms and information security risk to the 
consumer, restrictions of that data and its tethered code will survive 
intermediate First Amendment scrutiny.  
IV.   CODE WARNINGS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Perhaps the primary objection that would arise in connection with an 
approach such as the one set forth in Part III would involve First 
Amendment concerns regarding content neutrality of regulation, 
liability for data/code without knowledge of fault, and chilling of 
speech, particularly as it relates to the identities of certain creators or 
operators. This part addresses each of these First Amendment concerns 
in turn. Fundamentally, in instances where the data with tethered code 
increases the likelihood that the consumers will lose control of their 
machines and become victims of information crime, regulation of this 
data tethered to code should be and will likely be deemed to comport 
with the First Amendment. Although some risks of chilling speech may 
exist, regulation targeting nonexpressive incidental effects of this data 
tethered to code does not violate the First Amendment. This approach is 
theoretically rooted in O’Brien, buttressed by knowledge standards from 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.170 In particular, the critical state of 
information security threatens continued efficacy of key social systems. 
This situation warrants First Amendment paradigms that create 
incentives for creators and operators to act with due care and diligence 
in connection with their code.  
                                                                                                                     
 168. For a discussion of how changing the learning context changes the process of learning, 
see, for example, ALBERT BANDURA, SELF-EFFICACY IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1995). 
 169. 391 U.S. 367, 370–71, 386 (1968). 
 170. 418 U.S. 323, 334 (1974). 
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A.  Content Neutrality 
Should states wish to regulate communication with regard to its 
information security impact, these regulations would constitute a 
content-neutral approach.171 Borrowing a content neutrality test from 
Professor John Hart Ely, a content-neutral regulation is one where it 
becomes irrelevant whether the consumer understands English.172 Here, 
this test is met: the content of data is not relevant to its regulation; data 
in any language poses the same functionality and information security 
risks as long as it is tethered to compromised code. The risk arises from 
the information security outcome triggered by the code behind the 
content.  
Content-neutral regulations are not necessarily problematic from a 
First Amendment perspective; regulations targeting incidental effects of 
speech, avoiding content, are not unprecedented and have been upheld 
by the Court as comporting with the First Amendment. In O’Brien, the 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a regulation prohibiting 
the burning of draft cards constituted a prior restraint on speech that 
violated the First Amendment.173 The Court determined that “when 
‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of 
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the 
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First 
Amendment freedoms.”174 Consequently,  
a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is 
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it 
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; 
if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression 
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on 
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of that interest.175  
Turning to another similar intermediate scrutiny First Amendment 
context, time, place, manner restrictions have been upheld in numerous 
contexts, including restricting placement of tobacco advertisements,176 
                                                                                                                     
 171. Prohibiting speech simply on the content or viewpoint expressed is facially 
unconstitutional. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381–83 (1992); Simon & 
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124 (1991) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
 172. John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and 
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1483–90 (1975). 
 173. 391 U.S. at 370. For a discussion of O’Brien, see, for example, Volokh, supra note 55, 
at 1286.  
 174. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. 
 175. Id. at 377. 
 176. See generally Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (holding that 
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restricting use of sound trucks177 and amplified music,178 restricting use 
of automatic dialing-announcing devices,179 restricting parades,180 and 
restricting locations of adult theaters.181 Limiting data tethered to code 
and the communications about these digital products which exacerbate 
consumers’ functionality and information security risks is consonant 
with the theory behind these restrictions—it serves an important 
government purpose182 that is not related to suppression of speech.183 
Although the approach proposed in Part III may not be the only way of 
achieving the desired goal, it is not mandatory as a matter of First 
Amendment doctrine that the proposed approach be the least speech-
restrictive alternative.184  
Just as the Court in O’Brien found a vital interest in the continued 
functionality of the Selective Service System,185 identity theft and 
zombie botnets harm both society as a whole through undermining key 
social systems and individual consumers in their economic 
reputations.186 Identity theft and zombie botnets run by organized 
cybercrime threaten the continued functionality of the Social Security 
System and threaten other national interests. Because social security 
numbers (SSNs) are a disproportionately useful piece of personally 
identifiable information for an identity thief, they are a primary target 
for information criminals. As many as one in seven adult SSNs has 
already been compromised as a result of data breaches in the last several 
years.187 As the trajectory of compromise currently stands, SSNs will 
                                                                                                                     
Massachusetts had demonstrated a substantial interest in preventing access to tobacco products 
by minors and certain provisions had employed appropriately narrow means to advance that 
interest). 
 177. See generally Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding restrictions on use of 
sound trucks). 
 178. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (restricting amplified 
music and emphasizing that the time, place, and manner regulation must be narrowly tailored to 
serve a legitimate government interest). 
 179. See, e.g., Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1556 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(acknowledging that a Minnesota regulation on the use of automatic dialing-announcing devices 
triggers First Amendment review but upholding the law as a legitimate time, place, or manner 
regulation). 
 180. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (finding a parade permit 
ordinance constitutional). 
 181. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62–63 (1976) (concluding that the 
city’s interest supports the different treatment of adult theatres, limiting “the place where [adult] 
films may be exhibited,” even though based on distinguishing content). 
 182. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 180–81 (1997). 
 183. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 570 (1991). 
 184. See, e.g., Turner, 520 U.S. at 217–18. 
 185. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381 (1968). 
 186. For a discussion of a possessor of land’s duty to warn and protect entrants from 
physical harm, see supra notes 126–39 and accompanying text.  
 187. Gartner Press Release, upra note 15. 
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soon become an unusable method of authenticating U.S. residents for 
obtaining social services. Some experts believe that the level of 
compromise of SSNs has already reached the point where they can no 
longer be used as a primary means of authenticating identity.188 As 
described in Part II, large numbers of businesses, nonprofits, and 
government agencies appear to suffer data breaches on a regular basis. 
These numbers do not bode well for the survival of the Social Security 
System as a means of authenticating U.S. citizens for purposes of 
government benefits. This negative trajectory becomes particularly 
apparent when the statistics of SSN compromise are coupled with the 
Government Accountability Office’s annual findings of failing or 
inadequate information security practices in most federal agencies189 
and the lack of meaningful improvements to leakage of social security 
numbers by private entities.190 
Compromising communication is fast becoming a method of choice 
for Internet criminals. They seek to efficiently cause damage or steal 
consumer information from consumer systems and to turn such systems 
into zombie drones191 for attacking other consumers by sending 
malicious communication as part of a zombie botnet network.192 An 
inadequately protected personal computer can be “owned” by an 
attacker in under four minutes. 193 Approximately 250,000 new zombies 
are identified per day194 with approximately 100 to 150 million total 
                                                                                                                     
 188. Id. 
 189. See, e.g., Alice Lipowicz, DHS Still Remiss on Cybersecurity: GAO, WASH. TECH., 
Mar. 3, 2007, http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2007/03/21/dhs-still-remiss-on-
cybersecurity-gao.aspx; Information Security: Agencies Report Progress, but Sensitive Data 
Remain at Risk: Testimony Before Cong. Subcommittees, Comm. on Oversight and 
Government Reform, H.R., 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of Gregory C. Wilhusen, Director, 
Information Security Issues), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07935t.pdf (finding 
that federal agencies do not maintain acceptable information security practices); Grant Gross, 
VA Ignores Cybersecurity Warnings, PCWORLD, June 14, 2006, http://www.pcworld.com/artic 
le/id,126093-page,1/article.html. 
 190. For example, 50,000 General Electric employees’ social security numbers were 
compromised in September 2006. See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, http://www.privacyrights. 
org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2009). 
 191. Zombie drones are security-compromised machines that can be controlled remotely 
without the consumer’s knowledge for sending communication or other malicious purposes. See 
Primer: Zombie Drone, supra note 24.  
 192. Botnets are organized networks of remotely compromised machines, harnessed by 
criminals for the purpose of sending spam, conducting denial of service attacks, and other 
nefarious purposes. Botnets are frequently part of organized criminal operations. The changing 
character of spam toward primarily a criminal enterprise also drives spam internationalization in 
production. See Clive Thompson, The Virus Underground, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 8, 2004, at 
28, 79, 82.  
 193. Clean System to Zombie Bot in Four Minutes, SLASHDOT, http://slashdot.org/article.p 
l?sid=04/11/30/1932245. 
 194. For example, one Polish spam group uses over 450,000 compromised systems, “most 
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zombies currently in operation, by some expert estimates.195 Eastern 
European organized crime syndicates have begun launching extortion 
rackets against businesses in other countries, threatening them with 
attacks from zombie drones.196 The threat to international critical 
infrastructure posed by this international market in zombie drones is 
severe.197 For example, an army of zombie drones could be used to 
carry out an attack on electrical power infrastructure, disrupting service. 
According to the CIA, power outages in multiple cities outside the 
United States can be traced to cyberattacks where extortion demands 
were ignored.198 Similarly, vital national security interests are 
implicated when machines within agencies and machines with critical 
infrastructure roles become owned as part of a zombie drone army 
because an employee imprudently, for example, clicked on a link in an 
email which led to a compromised website.199  
Finally, digital products’ current black box system threatens trust in 
the Internet as a viable communication and commercial medium.200 One 
                                                                                                                     
of them home computers running Windows high-speed connections” all over the world. See, 
e.g., CipherTrust’s Zombie Statistics, upra note 16. 
 195. Weber, supra note 16. 
 196. Menn, supra note 17. This trend is concerning particularly because numerous U.S. 
federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, have repeatedly failed 
cybersecurity review of the Government Accounting Office. McCullagh, supra note 17. 
According to FBI sources, the Eastern European mafia views sending out emails as its “9 to 5 
job.” Grasso, supra note 17.  
 197. David Bank, New Virus Can Turn You into a Spammer, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2004, at 
D1. A black market also has developed for zero-day exploit code to be included in or used in 
connection with spam. Zero-day exploit code is code which exploits a security vulnerability for 
which there is no known patch and of which the vendor is not aware. George V. Hulme, Zero-
day Attacks Expected to Increase, INFO. WEEK, Mar. 24, 2003, at 32; Comments of Simple 
Nomad, Stanford University, Cybersecurity, Research and Disclosure Conference, Nov. 22, 
2003; see also The Beagle Has Landed, WIRED, Jan. 23, 2004, http://www.wired.com/print/tech 
biz/it/news/2004/01/61976; Ron Hale, Intrusion Crackdown, http://www.itsecurity.com/papers/ 
telenisus.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2009). 
 198. See Tom Espiner, CIA: Cyberattack Caused Multiple-City Blackout, CNET NEWS, Jan. 
22, 2008, http://www.news.com/2100-7349_3-6227090.html. 
 199. See supra note 18. 
 200. The primary real space comparison used for first generation of digital products and 
communication was postal mail. Email has proven itself in its developmental trajectory to be a 
fundamentally different medium than postal mail. In 2001, only 8% of U.S. email traffic was 
spam. Luiz Henrique Gomes et al., Characterizing a Spam Traffic (2004), available at 
http://www.imconf.net/imc-2004/papers/p356-gomes.pdf. However, by comparison, in 2003, 
40% of traffic was spam, and by 2004, this figure rose to 73% of traffic. By comparison, 
approximately only 40% of U.S. postal service mail is commercial in nature. Also, 25% of 
Internet consumers have already diminished their use of email because of spam. A parallel cut 
has not been noted for postal mail, due to the presence of commercial communications. See 
DEBORAH FALLOWS, PEW INTERNET AND AMERICAN LIFE FOUNDATION, SPAM: HOW IT IS 
HURTING EMAIL AND DEGRADING LIFE ON THE INTERNET i, 12 (2003), available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2003/PIP_Spam_Report.pdf.pdf. 
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in every sixteen emails has been found to carry a virus.201 The 
pervasiveness of these risks has impaired consumers’ sense of control 
over their own systems to the extent that consumers have started to use 
the Internet less as a consequence.202 If consumers determine that they 
cannot use the data of even trusted speakers without putting themselves 
at risk for identity theft because of the attached code, they may lose 
faith in the medium as a whole for communication. 
B.  Liability for Knowledge of Risk and Failure to Warn 
Although protecting consumers and preserving critical systems are 
core concerns with regard to information security risk, creator and 
operator side concerns also exist. A regulatory approach which imposes, 
in essence, a strict liability approach to punishing speech will inevitably 
result in chilled speech—speakers speaking less for fear of punishment. 
Creators and operators may worry that they will bundle data with code 
that harms consumers unknowingly. However, particularly in the 
context of data tethered to code which exacerbates functionality or 
information security risk, regulation should temper liability with a 
knowledge qualification. Even information security experts cannot 
foresee all possible security issues before they arise.203 The operative 
                                                                                                                     
 201. Michael Binder, Assistant Deputy Minister, Spectrum Info. and Telecomms. Tech., 
Lecture to ICT Standards Advisory Council of Canada (Mar. 22, 2005) (presentation available 
at http://www.isacc.ca/isacc/_doc/Book19-2005/ISACC-05-33300.pdf).  
 202. See FALLOWS, supra note 200, at 12. To date, the FTC has prosecuted under 100 
individuals and entities for spam fraud. See Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade 
Commission on “Unsolicited Commercial Email”: Statement Before the Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection, Subcomm. on 
Telecommunications and the Internet, 108th Cong. 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/spamtest.htm. Most of these enforcement actions involved false 
content and were brought under § 5 of the Fair Trade Act, alleging that the defendants in 
question engaged in unfair trade practices. See, e.g., Complaint for Civil Penalties, Permanent 
Injunction, and Other Relief at 2, United Statesv. Global Mortgage Funding, Inc., No. SACV 
07-1275 DOC (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30,2007); Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Permanent 
Injunction at 1, FTC v. Westby, No. 03 C 2540 (N.D. Ill. Mar.. 4, 2004); FTC v. NetSource 
One, No. 022-3077 (W.D. Ky. filed Nov. 2, 2002); FTC v. Cyber Data, No. CV 02-2120 LKK 
(E.D. Cal. filed Oct. 2002); FTC v. Internet Specialists, No. 302 CV 01722 RNC (D.Conn. filed 
Oct. 2002); Stipulated Judgment and Order for Permanent Injuction at 2, FTC v. Patrick Cella, 
No. CV-03-3202 (C.D. Cal.Nov. 20, 2003); Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Permanent 
Injuction and Other Equitable Relief at 2, FTC v. K4 Global Publ’g, Inc., No  5:03-CV-0140-3-
CAR (M.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 2003); Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief 
at 1, FTC v. Clickformail.com, Inc., No. 03-C-3033 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2003). A more apt 
comparison might be a person with a possibly contagious illness entering a room full of people. 
The illness may spread simply because the person shook hands with someone in the room. If the 
person obtains a reputation as someone who spreads disease, people will become unwilling to 
shake hands with him. 
 203. See, e.g., comments of Prof. Ed Felton, Computer Law Section panel on information 
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question is whether once a vulnerability is discovered or should have 
been discovered204 that all reasonable steps are expeditiously taken to 
remedy the problem. Information risks will always exist; the operative 
inquiry is into how they are handled after discovery. Responses and the 
levels of care vary dramatically, and many organizations feel adequate 
economic and legal incentives do not exist to warrant vigilance and 
immediate fixes to information security problems.205  
In situations where creators or operators know or should know that 
their data is tethered to code that exposes a consumer to additional 
functionality or information security risks, a legitimate state interest in 
regulation and consumer protection exists. States can properly impose 
liability. Regarding the standard of knowledge that might pertain to the 
speaker under an analysis using the O’Brien-inspired framework 
proposed above, the cases of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.206 and New 
York Times v. Sullivan207 provide possible guidance. 
In Gertz, the Supreme Court considered the liability of a magazine 
publisher for libel in connection with an article alleging that the plaintiff 
was part of a communist conspiracy to frame a policeman convicted of 
murder.208 The Court held that in the case where defamation of a private 
individual is at issue rather than a public figure, the First Amendment 
does not prevent liability for the publisher and that the plaintiff is not 
required to prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the 
truth.209 In situations where private individuals are made more 
vulnerable to injury and substantial danger is apparent, the state interest 
in protecting them is correspondingly greater, and states are at liberty to 
set lower burdens of proof of fault.210 Consequently, where some degree 
of fault exists, liability can be deemed appropriate by state law for 
speech. Therefore, following the logic of Gertz, states can be free to 
impose liability for data tethered to code that magnifies functionality 
and information security risks for consumers so long as they do not 
                                                                                                                     
security, AALS ANNUAL MEETING, New York, New York, Jan. 4, 2008. 
 204. A vulnerability should be known by a vulnerable speaker if the vulnerability is known 
generally in the information security community. 
 205. For example, in the recent TJX data breach, the company was using substandard 
encryption to protect millions of consumers’ data. Most home routers employ stronger 
encryption than that which was employed by TJX. For a discussion of the TJX breach, see, for 
example, Mark Jewell, TJX Data Breach Now Called World’s Largest: 45.7 Million Cards Were 
Compromised, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, Mar. 30, 2007, available at http://www.signonsand 
iego.com/uniontrib/20070330/news_1b30tjx.html. 
 206. 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). 
 207. 376 U.S. 254, 271–80 (1964). 
 208. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 326–27. 
 209. Id. at 347. 
 210. Id. at 344–46. 
43
Matwyshyn: Hidden Engines of Destruction: The Reasonable Expectation of Code
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
152 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
impose liability without fault.211 Such regulation is intended to protect 
consumers from identity theft, among other things, and constitutes a 
“protection of private personality . . . left primarily to the individual 
States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.”212 Similarly, there is a 
“strong and legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals 
for injury to reputation,” 213 such as the economic reputation damage 
caused by identity theft. Data tethered to code that exposes consumers 
to additional information security risk represents a “careless error”214 
that does not “materially advance[] society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open’ debate on public issues,”215 and “belong[s] to [a] 
category of utterances which ‘. . . any benefit that may be derived from 
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order.’”216  
However, even presuming that this Gertz standard may not be 
optimal, a more difficult standard of reckless disregard for the 
information security impact of the data with code that is modeled after 
New York Times v. Sullivan217 would still provide a workable 
standard.218 In New York Times v. Sullivan, an elected official sued the 
New York Times in connection with an advertisement he alleged to be 
libelous.219 In finding the speech at issue to be protected by the First 
Amendment, the Court articulated a standard of actual malice required 
to negate the presumption of Constitutional protection for the speech: 
the Court found that a “statement . . . made with ‘actual malice’—that 
is, with knowledge . . . or with reckless disregard” is not protected First 
Amendment speech.220 In the context of data tethered to a flawed code, 
where the creator or operator can be shown to have had actual 
knowledge or reckless disregard of increasing the risk of functionality 
                                                                                                                     
 211. In instances where an aggrieved consumer cannot demonstrate reckless disregard for 
her information security by a speaker, recovery should be limited to actual injury, as broadly 
defined by the Gertz Court to include out-of-pocket loss, impairment of reputation and standing, 
personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering, all of which frequently arise in cases of 
identity theft. According to Gertz, states may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive 
damages when liability is not based on knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, 
and a plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than the New York 
Times test may recover compensation only for actual injury. Id. at 349. 
 212. Id. at 341. 
 213. Id. at 348–49. 
 214. Id. at 340. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). 
 217. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 218. However, adopting the New York Times v. Sullivan standard would eliminate the 
option for suits on the basis of negligent speech about code—a failure to warn. Suits for 
negligent functionality limitation or information security conduct would remain a viable option, 
of course. 
 219. Id. at 256. 
 220. Id. at 279–80. 
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or information crime for the consumer, the speech at issue can, as a First 
Amendment matter, be regulated and provide a basis for liability. 
C.  Chilling and Speaker Neutrality 
A core First Amendment concern is that of chilling speech and 
distorting public discourse.221 It might be argued that by imposing equal 
obligations of care in connection with information security implications 
on all creators and operators, a disproportionate burden may be placed 
on small creators or operators holding unpopular positions. By imposing 
an affirmative obligation of information security care in connection with 
data bound with code, the proportional costs of compliance may be 
greater for these two groups than for a large, uncontroversial creator or 
operator and their speech may be chilled as a consequence. Although 
the proposed model may indeed result in greater proportional costs to 
these two groups, that is not necessarily the case in all instances. 
Through careful assessment of their code needs and through careful 
contracting, any additional costs can be minimized. Choices about code 
dictate choices about security. Because the standard for liability 
advocated here turns on actual knowledge or some degree of fault, 
exercising reasonable care in information risk management does not 
necessarily disproportionately burden these small or unpopular creators 
or operators. For example, the best information security outcome, if not 
the most efficient business outcome, may be encouraging creators and 
operators to outsource data management and information security 
services, while simultaneously considering it more aggressively in their 
own risk management and contracting practices. Those lacking 
expertise in information systems who attempt to manage their own 
information systems are likely to experience a greater number of 
information security problems and negative public relations 
consequences.222  
                                                                                                                     
 221. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &  
MARY L. REV. 189, 198 (1983) (“[T]he [F]irst [A]mendment is concerned, not only with the 
extent to which a law reduces the total quantity of communication, but also—and perhaps even 
more fundamentally—with the extent to which the law distorts public debate.”). S e id. at 192–
93 (“The Court’s primary concern in the content-neutral realm is that such restrictions, by 
limiting the availability of particular means of communication, can significantly impair the 
ability of individuals to communicate their views to others. This is, of course, a central [F]irst 
[A]mendment concern, for to the extent that content-neutral restrictions actually reduce the total 
quantity of expression, they necessarily undermine the ‘search for truth,’ impede meaningful 
participation in ‘self-governance,’ and frustrate individual ‘self-fulfillment.’”). 
 222. Small entrepreneurial ventures may indeed have fewer resources to invest in 
information security processes and monitoring. However, small ventures sometimes engage in 
behaviors that exacerbate their own information security risks unnecessarily. For example, small 
ventures frequently have a tendency to engage in aggressive data collection and hoarding, 
including collecting personally identifiable data that is not needed for processing of any 
transactions authorized by the customer. By choosing to hoard information, these ventures make 
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Speakers holding unpopular positions on their websites, for example, 
may indeed be more likely to be the victims of information criminals 
seeking to harm their supporters through the Internet in order to silence 
them. This technological reality should push them to consider 
functionality and information security risks more aggressively, in much 
the same way that they expect hecklers in real space to attack them 
verbally with more zeal. In other words, it is not a regulation mandating 
care in speech that would disproportionately burden them; it is the 
combination of technology and the unpopularity of their speech, 
regardless of medium.223 Meanwhile, if consumers begin to associate 
unpopular speakers with increased functionality and information 
security risks, they may become unwilling to listen to unpopular 
communication. A minimum statutory level of care may actually 
provide comfort to consumers while listening to unpopular 
communication. 
From a First Amendment standpoint, the data implicated can 
encompass two distinct kinds of speech—commercial224 nd political.225 
However, from a functionality and information security standpoint, all 
data is essentially identical; all data potentially exposes consumers to 
significantly increased functionality and information security risks if 
                                                                                                                     
themselves more attractive to information criminals, thereby triggering a need for more rigorous 
security processes. Similarly, when hiring developers who write custom code for such ventures, 
small ventures may be less likely to use counsel and less likely to include information security 
requirements which can easily be negotiated into the specifications for the speech. Proactively 
considering ways to mitigate information risk may assist not only the consumers’ of small 
companies, it may also assist the companies themselves. For example, teaching entrepreneurs to 
consider information security from the inception of the enterprise will assist them in obtaining 
trade secret protection to defend their proprietary information assets. Also, hiring a dedicated 
high-quality hosting company with strong information security standards may not only reduce 
risk of communications being compromised, but may also result in long term cost-savings over 
maintaining Internet communications in-house. Public relations damage can potentially be 
mitigated through shifting blame to an external services provider. 
 223. Through assessing the information risk structure associated with particular 
communication strategies, these speakers may realize they are gratuitously exposing themselves 
to certain types of information security problems. Careful contracting and choosing 
intermediaries such as hosts and ISPs can again alleviate much of the concern. In the context of 
unpopular speech in particular, because attacks on communication have become sophisticated, 
protecting the message and ensuring that consumers will not be victimized should rank as an 
organizational priority. As a practical matter, unless the speakers are information security 
experts, they will lack the expertise to do so effectively.  
 224. For a discussion of commercial speech, see generally Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. 
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (holding that a regulation completely 
banning an electric utility from advertising to promote the use of electricity violates the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 225. For a discussion of political speech, see generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 
(1976) (ruling on the constitutionality of several provisions of the Federal Election Campaign 
Act). 
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tethered to code.226 It is true that a First Amendment incongruity arises 
in connection with speaker identity—the proposed regulatory approach 
adopts an identity neutral approach while existing case law addressing 
communication adopts a commercial speech analysis. As discussed in 
Part III.A.2, the dominant analytical approach used by courts in 
connection with digital products has been analysis under the 
commercial speech standards of Central Hudson227 and its progeny, 
which looks to the commercial or noncommercial identity of the 
speaker and the content of the speech. In contrast, the proposed 
statutory approach creates a mandatory real-time information security 
feedback loop that would apply to all content creators or operators, 
regardless of commercial or noncommercial motivation. As such, it can 
be argued that the approach proposed by this Article burdens 
noncommercial speakers in a way they have heretofore not been 
burdened in connection with their communication. This assertion is 
accurate; however, this identity neutral approach is driven by 
technological necessity. A commercial speech centered restriction is 
doomed to technological failure. Any successful functionality and 
information security speech regulatory regime must be inherently 
speaker neutral. Information security processes are only as successful as 
the weakest point in the information security chain. Commercial or 
noncommercial identity does not impact the functionality or information 
security risks code carries. Similarly, data content, commercial or 
otherwise, is not the source of concern. A compromised political 
website can cause the same information security damage to consumers 
as a compromised commercial website. Therefore speaker neutrality is 
mandated by the technological reality of the policy problem.228 
D.  Compelled Speech 
As articulated by the Supreme Court in Wooley v. Maynard,229 
although “the right of freedom of thought protected by the First 
Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely 
and the right to refrain from speaking at all,”230 in circumstances where 
                                                                                                                     
 226. Both of these communications may have resulted in the theft of the consumer’s 
identity and a consumer unknowingly becoming part of a remotely controlled organized 
information crime computer network. In the language of computer security, remote compromise 
of a machine can lead to the owned machine becoming part of a zombie network used for 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks and information crime. For a discussion of zombie 
drones and remote compromise, see Matwyshyn, supra note 5, at 378–79. 
 227. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 228. It can also be argued that this type of speaker neutral approach recognizes the Court’s 
trend toward converging levels of constitutional protection for political and commercial speech. 
See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501–03 (1996). 
 229. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 230. Id. at 714 (1977) (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & 
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an ideologically neutral compelling state interest warrants compelling 
speech, such compelled speech is constitutionally permissible.231 
Compelled speech approaches are frequently used in consumer 
protection contexts; contexts such as securities disclosure,232 food and 
drug labeling,233 alcohol and tobacco labeling,234 and real estate 
disclosures235 provide examples of instances where compelled speech is 
                                                                                                                     
Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 69 (2006) (requiring universities to advertise presence of 
military recruiters on campus); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 , 86–87 (1980) 
(upholding free speech rights of individuals on private property of shopping mall); W. Va. State 
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633–34 (1943) (refusing to uphold West Virginia statute 
requiring saluting of the flag in schools). Additional cases have limited the government’s ability 
to force one speaker to host or accommodate another speaker’s message. See, e.g, Hurley v. 
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573–574 (1995) (holding 
that state law cannot require a parade to include a group whose message the parade’s organizer 
does not wish to send); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 21 
(1986) (ruling that a state agency cannot require a utility company to include a third-party 
newsletter in its billing envelope); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 
(1974) (holding that a right-of-reply statute violates editors’ right to determine the content of 
their newspapers). 
 231. For a discussion of compelled speech, see Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The 
Right of Expressive Access in First Amendment Theory: Redistributive Values and the 
Democratic Dilemma, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1083, 1113–23 (1999). For several scholarly articles 
about various aspects of commercial speech, see Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 
CONST. COMMENT. 147 (2006); Mark Champoux, Uncovering Coherence in Compelled Subsidy 
of Speech Doctrine: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005), 29 HARV. 
J.L. &  PUB. POL’Y 1107 (2006); Government Speech Doctrine—Compelled Support for 
Agricultural Advertising, 119 HARV. L. REV. 277 (2005); Lewis Michael Higgins, Constitutional 
Law—First Amendment—Compelled Funding of Government Speech Through the Use of 
Targeted Assessments Does not Violate the First Amendment, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 643 (2006); 
Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled 
Physician Speech, U. ILL. L. REV. 939 (2007); Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: 
Compelled Commercial Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, 
Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555 (2006). 
 232. For a discussion of securities disclosure and speech, see Michael R. Siebecker, 
Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an Institutional Approach to the First 
Amendment, 48 WM. &  MARY L. REV. 613 (2006). 
 233. For example, in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997), the 
Court found that compelled subsidies for generic fruit advertising did not burden First 
Amendment rights, and instead evaluated the program “under the standard appropriate for the 
review of economic regulation . . . .” Id. at 469; see also Joseph Wilhelm, Comment, Compelled 
Commercial Speech Under the Beef Promotion Act Should be Impermissible: United States v. 
Frame, 885 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1989), 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021 (1991) (discussing the speech 
involved under the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985). 
 234. For a discussion of labeling of “vice” products, see Kathryn Murphy, Note, Can the 
Budweiser Frogs Be Forced to Sing a New Tune?: Compelled Commercial Counter-Speech and 
the First Amendment, 84 VA. L. REV. 1195 (1998). 
 235. For a discussion of real estate disclosures, see Tanya D. Marsh & Robert G. Solloway, 
Survey: Property Law: Let the Seller Beware: The Slow Demise of Caveat Emptor in Real 
Property Transactions and Other Recent Developments in Indiana Real Property Law, 38 IND. 
L. REV. 1317 (2005). 
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used successfully to further a compelling state interest in consumer 
protection. In the context of consumer protection from the hidden 
engines of destruction in data tethered to code, the case is equally—if 
not more—compelling. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
This Article explored whether a duty to warn should exist in the 
context of digital products and argued in favor of creating a “reasonable 
expectation of code safety.” Code will never be perfect, the same way 
that land is never perfect. New vulnerabilities are found every day in 
much the same way that the owner of an old house finds a new creaky 
step or a broken pipe. In both cases, perfection is not possible; the best 
approach is a process-based one which requires vigilant inspection, 
clear and ample disclosure and warning, and consistent monitoring with 
prompt repair.  
Therefore, to adequately address these hidden engines of destruction, 
Congress or state legislatures should enact a three-tiered duty to warn 
and repair. Such legislation would improve information parity and 
consumers’ control over the digital products they use. Existing data 
breach notification laws alone cannot solve the security problems that 
lurk in the code behind the digital content. 
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